Issue 12, October 2018

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About the bulletin

The Conflict Analysis bulletin, part of the Conflict Analysis Project  is an initiative by Lebanon Support, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), available on the Civil Society Knowledge Centre (CSKC), Lebanon Support’s knowledge platform. The Conflict Analysis Project aims to make available and accessible information and research about conflicts in Lebanon, in order to better understand their underlying causes, and inform interventions and policy-making.

This bulletin features visuals focusing on conflict trends mapped during the second third of 2018. It also highlights a selection of the latest publications on the project’s page, including papers, articles, reports, visuals, and interactive content.

Defining Conflict

Going beyond the view of conflict through a security framework associated with belligerency and violence, Lebanon Support upholds that conflict is of a socio-political nature. It thus sheds light on dynamics underlying a broad spectrum of violent and non-violent contentions including social movements, conflicts opposing minorities (ethnic, religious or sexual among others) as well as local, national or regional actors’ policies.
Read more on and visit the interactive conflict map here.

Main data trends from the May- August 2018 period:

• The second third of 2018 witnessed a total of 1239 incidents which is a decrease of 13% compared to the first third of the year and a decrease of 31% compared to the same period last year.
• Baalbeck became the most mapped location with a total of 148 incidents. The caza witnessed an unsteady security situation for the past four months with an overall increase of conflict incidents by 42% compared to the first third of the year.
• Although the number of arrests (420) decreased by 15% compared to the first third of the year (493), it remained the most mapped category of incident between May and August 2018.
• No less than 6 armed clashes were mapped in the span of four months, which is consistent with the number recorded during the previous third (7). Most of them were the result of disputes between rival families, or erupted during Army’s operations to arrest  wanted criminal groups.
• 10 hostage taking situations were mapped between May and August 2018 which is consistent with the numbers recorded during the first third of the year.
• The number of incidents classified Border Conflicts with Syria (69) decreased by 19% compared to the first third of 2018 (85), with incidents mainly related to Syrian nationals arrested for illegal entry.

1. Overview of conflict incidents mapped (May-August 2018)

The second third of 2018 witnessed a total of 1239 incidents which is a decrease of 13% compared to the first third of the year. The incidents recorded were scattered across the country since incidents in the 5 most mapped cazas amounted to less than 37% of the total mapped incidents. 

Between May and August 2018, Baalbeck became the most mapped location with a total of 148 incidents, detroning Sour which only arrived on the third position. Indeed, Baalbeck witnessed an unsteady security situation for the past four months with an overall increase of conflict incidents by 42%. The latter were mainly related to Individual Acts of Violence such as shootings, disputes, robberies, murders, among other crimes. The deteriorating security situation in this caza has been contested by the residents who have been protesting several times demanding authorities to take action and restore security in the area. In fact, Baalbeck is often perceived as “safe haven” for criminals and fugitives who are often protected by political parties or dominant families in the area. In response to the deteriorating security situation, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have launched at the end of June a security plan in Baalbeck which consisted of heavy military deployment, raids operations, and arrests of wanted criminals.  

The number of incidents mapped in Beirut (127) considerably increased by 70% compared to the first third of 2018 (75) making the capital the second most mapped location. It was followed by Sour with a total of 106 incidents. The increase of incidents in Beirut could be attributed to the rise of state interventions with recurrent raids and arrests operations occurring in this district in response to criminal acts such as robbery, illicit trade, and shooting. Indeed, Beirut is the Lebanese capital and represents the centre of the economic, political, and cultural activities in Lebanon as well as its largest city with an estimated number of 1.5 million inhabitants, which explains the eminent state’s presence and intervention in the caza.

• Categories

Although the number of arrests (420) decreased by 15% compared to the first third of the year (493), it remained the most mapped category of incident between May and August 2018. Similarly, while the airspace violations by the Israeli Military witnessed a significant drop by 39% compared to the last third, it was still ranked as the second most mapped category. However, it is noteworthy to point that this decrease does not necessarily imply a de-escalation of tensions between Lebanon and Israel. Indeed, the latter have often been launching threats against Lebanon and Hezbollah over the past months, while Hezbollah has been warning Israel about the gowing forces and military capacity of its party. Moreover, the Israel Army has resumed the construction of a controversial wall at the borders, which has contributed to rising tensions between the countries. In this tense context, on August 30th, the Security State Council renewed the UNIFIL mandate by one additional year while warning the international community about the risks of resurgence of a new violent conflict in case the ceasefire agreed between Lebanon and Israel was violated. UNIFIL forces have been deployed on the Lebanese-Israeli borders since 1978, and reinforced after the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon. They have been mandated to mainly monitor cessation of hostilities, restore peace and security, as well as ensure the return of state effective authority in this area.

The number of shootings (117) increased by 17% compared to the first third of 2018 (100), with incidents mainly related to brawls and disputes that escalated violently but also resulting of celebratory shootings. Although celebratory shootings are common in Lebanon, the second third of the year witnessed a particular surge of such incidents. Indeed, this period witnessed many events and occasions which added a pretext for celebratory shootings such as the result of Parliamentary elections held on May 6^th, the result of the official exams at the end of June, as well as the beginning of the weddings season, among others. Despite the ISF campaign launched in June to raise awareness about the issue, gunfire were still used as a mean of celebration during the aforementioned occasions. (To learn more about shooting incidents, read the Conflict Analysis bulletin, Issue 10 here).

No less than 6 armed clashes were mapped in the span of four months, which is consistent with the number recorded during the previous third (7). Most of them were the result of disputes between rival families, or erupted during Army’s operations to arrest wanted criminal groups. For instance, on May 22^nd, a wanted criminal opened fire and thrown grenades towards an LAF patrol during an arrest operation. Most of the time, heavy artillery, grenades, machine guns, and other heavy weapons are used during these clashes, often leading to casualties, injuries, as well as material damages. Moreover, these clashes usually involve wanted criminals or member of prominent clans backed by their own militia. As a result, the eruption of armed clashes frequently occurred in Lebanon especially in Bekaa and Baalbeck, revealing the fragility of state control to maintain order in these areas.  

Although the number of gender-based violence incidents reported significantly decreased compared to the last third (27),13 cases were mapped between May and August 2018 mostly related to murders and femicides, indicating that approximately 3 women are victims of violence per month in Lebanon. Although VAW incidents are usually under-reported, these figures are still alarming (For more on gender-based violence read the Conflict Analysis bulletin, Issue 11 here).

10 hostage taking situations were mapped between May and August 2018. For instance, on August 18^th, the Army dismantled a smuggling ring in Zahle which allegedly smuggled Syrian nationals into the country and detained them until a ransom was paid for their release. Moreover, the ring confiscated the legal documents of their victims and demanded money in order to return them. Over 300 identity papers belonging to Syrian nationals were seized during this operation. Extortion and kidnapping of Syrian civilians and refugees in Lebanon has been on the rise since the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2012, especially on the Lebanese - Syrian border areas. Most of these involved organised criminal groups who are taking advantage of the precarious security and socio-economic situation in Syria as well as the vulnerability of the Syrian civilians and refugees in order to commit their crimes.

• Actors

Although the number of incidents involving the Israeli Military (354) decreased by 39% compared to the last third (579), it remained the most mapped actor. It is followed by the Lebanese civilians (349) and the Internal Security Forces (243).

More than half of the incidents involving Lebanese civilians were related to Individual Acts of Violence (200). Similar to the previous third, ISF appears to have been actively tackling smuggling operations since the majority of ISF interventions were relevant to illicit trade (125 incidents).

Syrian civilians were involved in 150 incidents which is a slight decrease compared to the previous third (190), with most of them relevant to the arrest of Syrian nationals for illegal stay, or for committing infractions such as forgery, illicit trade, robbery, etc. Similarly, the number of incidents involving Palestinian civilians (71) slightly decreased compared to the first third of the year (81). Also, the majority of the incidents were located in the refugees’ camp of Ain el-Helweh. 

2. Frequency of incidents by primary classification of conflict (May-August 2018)

Between May and August 2018, Individual Acts of Violence became the most mapped primary classification of conflict, surpassing the Israeli Border Conflicts. Indeed, the number of Individual Acts of Violence (545) increased by 17% compared to the last third (466), and represented alone 44% of the total mapped incidents. The majority of them (303) were related to state security apparatuses conducting military deployments, raids, and arrests operations against wanted suspects. Although most of these operations came as a response to criminality and law infringements, many of them were also pre-emptive measures to prevent security incidents from occurring and to maintain order. For instance, on May 6th, the Army heavily deployed across Lebanon as part of a security plan during the Parliamentary elections. (For more on state apparatuses actions check the Map of State Response here).

The number of incidents classified Border Conflicts with Syria (69) decreased by 19% compared to the first third of 2018 (85), with incidents mainly related to Syrian nationals arrested for illegal entry. Such arrests have been frequent over the past years, especially in the areas nearby the Lebanese- Syrian borders such as Marjaayoun and Hasbaya. Moreover, four of these incidents were also classified as Conflicts of Social Discrimination, mainly involving Army’s operations against Syrian refugees camp..

Also tensions have been increasing between host communities and Syrian refugees during the second third of 2018. On June 13th, a protest was organised in front of the UNRWA by Free Patriotic Movement supporters for Syrian refugees to return to their country. Also, on July 8th, following a dispute between Syrians refugees and Lebanese citizens, 47 of refugees tents were burned in Mhamra camp in Tripoli.

These incidents came in a context of rising tensions between the Lebanese Government and the international community regarding the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Indeed, over the past months, thousands of Syrian departed from Lebanon to Syria as what was reported as a “voluntary return”. However, the voluntary aspect of these returns have been contested by some elements within the international community as well as by the Lebanese civil society. A statement released by the UNHCR denied any involvement in these returns, and rather emphasised the need to investigate refugees’ intentions, and the conditions under which these returns took place. Likewise, several local civil society organisations released a joint statement firmly condemning Lebanese authorities hostile position against Syrian refugees and calling the government for policies aligned with human rights principles.  .Moreover,, various civil society actors in the mediterranean, which included Lebanese NGOs and activists, launched an online Manifesto for Solidarity, Humanity and Dignity with persons in exile, reiterating these principles over restrictive and inhumane migration policies.

Between May and August 2018, 199 incidents were classified as Power and Governance which is a slight decrease of 9% compared to the previous third. Most of these were related to illicit trade and trafficking of drugs, document forgery, and counterfeit money. Moreover, this period witnessed a rise of political tensions notably during the Parliamentary elections period, which sometimes resulted in disputes and confrontations between supporters of rival political parties. For instance, on May 8^th, one person was killed in Aley during a dispute between supporters of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Lebanese Democratic Party. Such incidents were seen by many as a threat to the Lebanese already fragile stability as they revived political and sectarian tensions, steering away the country from the “negative peace” it has been witnessing lately.

No less than 14 Conflicts of Social Discrimination were mapped in during the reporting period. 5 of them were categorised as collective actions in support of causes such as women’s rights, and domestic workers’ rights. For instance, on June 24, civil society’s actors organised a protest asking for Lebanese women right to pass their nationality onto their children. Over the past decades, civil society actors have been actively protesting in order to amend the law without any success so far. Authorities have argued that granting this right to women could disrupt the demographic balance in the country, without explaining how men could have this right without unsettling the country as well. In reality, despite some incremental steps in recent years to protect women rights, Lebanon sill does not guarantee equal rights for men and women.  Indeed, personal status laws which organise the personal status such as marriage, custody, and inheritance among others often tends to discriminate women.     

3. Focus on crackdown on social media by Lebanese authorities

Over the past two decades, cyberactivism has transformed the way political protests and social movements are organised. Digital activism is often seen as a new form of political participation which allows large groups of people to easily interact and mobilise for political actions. Yet, some scholars have warned against the illusion of the Internet as a public space as the fast growing support to online mobilisations is often followed by even faster disengagement. In Lebanon, social media are often used by civil society actors such as NGOs, activists, journalists, but also individuals as a mean to spread news, denounce or raise awareness about issues, as well as express political opinions.  

Many NGOs have been using online campaigns as a mode of action to mobilise supporters over their cause. (Check the Map of Collective Actions in Lebanon to learn more about online campaign here). While the internet is considered as a powerful tool to spread information in a short time, many experts have warned about its limitations as an effective activism tool, as well as dangers such as cyber bullying, online harassments, theft of personal information, among others cybercrimes. In 2006, ISF created the Cyber Crime and Intellectual Property Rights Bureau in order to combat cyber crimes and enhance online security in Lebanon. However, this bureau has generated many controversies since its establishment notably regarding the arbitrary enforcement of an outdated law from 1943 Penal Code, which criminalises defamation against public officials, the president, the Lebanese flag, or the national emblem. While freedom of speech and freedom of press are guaranteed by the Lebanese constitutions “within the limits established by the law”, the penal code is often used as an attempt to silence critics by incriminating individuals over mere jokes, sarcastic comments, or any criticisms towards government officials and religious figures.

Although this practice has been common for the past years, the detention of individuals for expressing personal opinion on social media seem to have been more recurrent over the last months. Indeed, no less than 9 of such incidents have been mapped in the span of four months only between May and August 2018. For instance, on July 20th, young activist Charbel Khoury was detained by the cybercrimes bureau for writing a post in an allegedly sarcastic tone about the miracles of Saint Charbel. Following the post, Charbel Khoury and Joy Slim – who interacted with Khoury’s post – have been massively insulted, bullied, harassed, and threatened online. This particular incident considerably questions the role and willingness of the bureau to effectively protect citizens against cybercrimes. In fact, instead of pursuing the harrassors, the Cyber Crime Bureau detained and interrogated Slim and Khoury for hours, indicating that the bureau acts more as a repressive institution impeding online speech rather than a security body fighting against online crimes.  Moreover, Khoury was only released after signing a pledge not to address religion in his posts and delete his facebook account for a month. Without having any legal basis, such pledges are frequently used by authorities as an intimidation tactic in order to refrain individuals from certain acts. Indeed, many detained individuals have reported of being threatened, assaulted, or forbidden to contact anyone including a lawyer during their interrogation. As a result, detained activists may bend to authorities pressure and end up signing pledges in exchange for their release, although these practices constitute a violation of Art. 47 of the Lebanese Code for Criminal Procedure which lists the rights of detained persons, notably the right to remain silent, and contact a family member or a lawyer.  

Overall, these practices and detentions constitute a threat to freedom of expression and reflect an increasingly shrinking space for free speech in Lebanon. As such, civil society has been actively mobilising against the infringement to the right of freedom of speech. An online campaign “Against repression” has been launched by several activists and NGOs in order to denounce this “unprecedented decline in freedom of expression in all forms.” Moreover, a “call for action to condemn the Lebanese authorities’ pervasive summons of peaceful activists infringing their right to freedom of expression”, was co-signed by several civil society organisations, in order to raise concerns regarding violations of the right to freedom of expression in Lebanon.

Demonstrations were also organised notably on July 24th and August 31st, to protest against such arbitrary arrests.

These recent events contributed to steer the debate about the space and limits of freedom of speech and reiterated the need to have an adapted law clearly defining both aspects, as to not be used as a mean to repress free expression while guaranteeing online security at the same time.

4. Event Invitation: Introducing the Conflict Analysis Project’s new mappings