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Conflict Incident Report

Lebanon network sent over $1M to Daesh

Date of incident: 
May 23, 2017
Death toll: 
0persons
Number of Injured: 
0persons
Actors/Parties Involved: 
Lebanese Civilians
Syrian Civilians/Refugees
Palestinian Civilians/Refugees
Islamic State (IS); Daech *
Lebanese Military Intelligence

A Lebanon-based network has reportedly made over $1 million worth of cash transfers from Lebanon to Daesh (ISIS) militants based in Syria, judicial investigations have uncovered. The network sending the funds typically made use of informal couriers and legitimate money exchange shops in Lebanon, Turkey, Syria and Dubai. The transfers took place without encountering blocks against financing the group or having receipts issued. Instead, they were reportedly made using a password distributed via cellphone, or by using specific nicknames.

The facts were divulged in an accusatory decision – the official issuing of a charge – made by First Investigative Judge Riad Abo Ghaida, based on information gathered by Army Intelligence. The information indicates that Ahmad R., a Syrian national and member of Daesh, had been transferring funds to the terrorist organization. He did so in cooperation with Daesh’s “prince” in Qalamoun, known as “Abu Baklis al-Iraqi,” and Syrian national Abed al-Kader Souad, also known as Sheikh Abu Hasan. The latter is a member of a charity organization based in the restive Syrian-Lebanese border town of Arsal. Following investigations, Ahmad confessed to owning two clothing stores, one based in Damascus and the other in Beirut. Alaa N., a resident of Arsal, was one of his major clients. Ahmad said he would typically send Alaa funds and merchandise through van driver Khalil A.

Alaa, in turn, would smuggle the goods and funds into Syria.

Khalil confessed to transporting money from Beirut to Arsal. He used a hidden compartment in his vehicle to transport $5,000 at a time.

The store owner confessed to sending over $1 million through Khalil between 2015 and 2016. He confirmed he knew the shipments were ultimately destined for Daesh militants in the Qalamoun region and elsewhere, and that the Arsal-based charity was a front for the illicit money transfers. In his testimony, Ahmad also confessed to sending two of his employees, Mohammad B. and Adi R., to local money transfer shops for other payments. The funds would be sent by Alaa. Couriers would only receive the funds after divulging a previously agreed password. Ahmad also said he sent the employees to an electronics store in Sabra, a Palestinian refugee camp in south Beirut. Investigations alleged that in one instance the couriers handed over $65,000 in cash. On another occasion, Ahmad handed $100,000 to a Lebanese national from Arsal to courier. Other transfers involved smaller sums, but one thing reportedly remained constant: The money always made its way to Syria.

The suspects’ statements were cross-referenced with evidence given by money transfer operators about these exchanges. The operators indicated that the way the funds had been transferred was suspicious, since the transfers required only that an identification card be shown by the recipient, rather than requiring more stringent identification measures. The court did not detail why the shops did not flag the transactions and completed the payments if they identified them as suspicious.

Ahmad even confessed to using OMT – a popular Lebanese money transfer service – as a cover for transferring money to Aleppo and Raqqa, Daesh’s de facto capital in Syria.

A technical inspection of the suspects’ phones indicated they had interacted with individuals known to be part of Daesh.

At the conclusion of his accusatory decision, Judge Ghaida requested life in prison with hard labor for the five suspects in question. Their charge: “Belonging to a terrorist organization, communicating with its members and financing it through Lebanese money exchange services.”

This security incident was mapped according to the closest possible location.
Primary category: 
Arrest/Detention
Secondary Category: 
Illicit Trade/Trafficking/Smuggling
Classification of conflict (primary): 
Border conflicts (Syrian border)
Violations, disputes and/or conflicts arising between rival armed groups along the Lebanese/Syrian borders which involve parties or militant groups from the Lebanese and Syrian side in both Lebanon and Syria. These conflicts also encompass transnational groups (such as faith-based regional groups, e.g. ISIS, al-Nusra Front) that cannot be considered as strictly Syrian, Lebanese or of any other national entity.
Classification of conflict(secondary):
Power & governance conflicts
Violent or non-violent conflicts associated with antagonisms related to internal political tensions between local and/or national groups and parties. These tensions may be encouraged by internal, regional and international parties. Such conflicts are characterized by their defiance and/or opposition to central State power and governance.