Timeline: Social Protection in Tunisia | February, 1959 to January, 2019
Publication date: June, 2022
Last updated on: June, 2022
This timeline retraces the main stages of the establishment and evolution of the social protection system in Tunisia. By presenting a chronological account of public policies in this field, it aims at highlighting the progressive evolution of a social protection system and its shortcomings against a changing social and economic reality.
The social protection system in Tunisia is generally considered to be amongst the more advanced and protective models in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Global studies highlight Tunisia’s favourable position in comparison to other countries in the region with 50.2% of the population covered by at least one social protection benefit (International Labour Organization 2021, 15). The Tunisian social protection system is based on a hybrid model made up of contributory schemes and non-contributory programmes, as well as other ad hoc service provisions. In accordance with contributory schemes, private sector social security is regulated through the National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale – CNSS) established in 1960, while the National Pension and Social Insurance Fund (Caisse Nationale de Retraite et de Prévoyance Sociale – CNRPS), created in 1985, covers the public sector. Both provide coverage for formal workers only, and offer pension schemes such as retirement pensions and death pensions, in addition to health insurance, maternity leave, paid leave, etc. As for non-contributory programs, they are characterised by both universal and ad hoc provisions. On the one hand, the state provides universal subsidies on basic items (mostly food, fuel, and gas) through the General Compensation Fund (Caisse Générale de Compensation – CGC) established in May 1970. On the other hand, a number of programmes target the poorest populations in various social and economic areas (health, housing, education, minimum income, as well as employability grants). The flagship social assistance program is the permanent cash transfer to families that are most in need (National Programme for Needy Families [Programme National Aux Familles Nécessiteuses – PNAFN]), in addition to free healthcare, which fall under the Amen Social Programme created in 2019. Established in 1986, the PNAFN sought to alleviate the impact of austerity reforms linked to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and namely, to the price hikes of basic commodities due to the reform of the CGC and the removal of subsidies. Its implementation followed a period of social unrest culminating in the outbreak of the so-called “bread riots” in 1983-1984.
The 2011 uprising in the country has shed light on the long-standing social issues and demands in relation to social justice that were concealed and/or repressed during the Ben Ali regime. Since then, several studies have pointed out critical gaps in the Tunisian social protection system. On the one hand, research on the Tunisian social protection framework highlights practical boundaries limiting effective access to the system for the targeted populations (World Bank 2016). On the other hand, studies question the system's capacity to reduce socio-economic inequalities (International Labour Organisation 2017). In this context, health coverage and unemployment constitute two main challenges. The available data indicates that in 2020, the social protection system left 14% of the Tunisian population without any health coverage, the equivalent of 1.7 million individuals (Economic Research Forum 2022a). Moreover, in a context where unemployment rates have been historically very high – even if they were carefully concealed under the Ben Ali regime (Hibou 2015, 2011) – no proper social protection mechanisms exist to combat job loss and unemployment. In 2021, the unemployment rate according to the National Institute of Statistics (Institut National de Statistiques – INS) amounted to 18.4%, and primarily concerned young men (42.8%) and women (41.7%) among the 15-24 age bracket. Informal forms of labour are also affecting young workers. In 2019, 44.8% of the Tunisian workforce is informal, with 60% of men and 83% of women being under 40 years of age (INS 2019). In this climate, it is worth noticing that reducing unemployment and accessing protected jobs – especially for the youth – have been amongst the main claims of the Tunisian revolution as well as of the social conflicts that have preceded and sometimes accompanied the 2011 uprising. A main example is that of the cycle of mobilisations that took place around the Gafsa Mining Company (Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa – CPG) beginning in 2008. In the disadvantaged, south-western region of Gafsa, the CPG, which is a public company, is traditionally seen as the sole provider of subsistence means, be it through the provision of employment or through its productive chain. The CPG is thus “anchored in the imagination as the only alternative to poverty” (Allal 2012, 825). As of 2008, the unemployed youth of the region claimed full integration into the, denouncing the nepotism on the level of recruitments and the clientelism and corruption of Ben Ali regime.
The existing mandatory social security schemes cover certain sectors, occupational categories, and social groups. Estimates show, for example, that women in the agricultural sector are under-covered. In 2012, a mere 1.148% of 509,208 women workers were affiliated with the social security regime, amounting to a total of 10.7% of the affiliations in this sector (Secrétariat d’Etat aux Affaires de la Femme et de la Famille (SEFF), UNWomen, OHCHR, 2014, 3).
Overall, the contributory system is structured around waged labour, leaving behind informal workers, who constitute about 50% of the working population. Similarly, self-employment status in the private sector, as well as seasonal or casual work and fixed-term contracts, are often characterised by multi-activity practices and irregularity of income, and remain under-covered by a variety of social security schemes. As far as the non-contributory system is concerned, the assistance programmes targeting the poorest populations reach a very limited number of households. For example, PNAFN reached out to 267,000 beneficiaries in 2017 (almost 8% of the Tunisian population), leaving behind increasingly vulnerable population groups weakened by a flagging economy (Economic Research Forum 2022b). In this context, the subsidies policy, though regressive, “outdated and flawed” (World Bank 2021), still plays a crucial role to offset the purchasing power of the most vulnerable categories and to maintain social peace.
The contributory system
In the first few decades following the independence from the French rule (1956), contributory social security schemes targeted the public sector salariat. In Tunisia, as well as in other Arab countries, wage employment (the salariat) concerned “public employment more than ever” (Longuenesse 2005, 20), and never constituted the dominant form of labour relations in the private sector. The first Retirement Pension Fund (Caisse Nationale de Retraite – CNR) and the Social Welfare Fund (Caisse de Prévoyance Sociale – CPS), both established in 1959, only concerned civil servants. In 1975, the CNR and the CPS were unified under the National Pension and Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Retraite et de Prévoyance Sociale – CNRPS). However, the legislative basis of the CNRPS was built under the Act 85-12 of 5 March 1985 (ESCWA 2016, 1). In 1960, the social protection insurance was expanded to the private sector workers with the creation of a National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale – CNSS). The establishment of the Labour Code in 1966, which governs wage activity in both the public and private sectors – integrating pensions, leave system, death benefits, and access to public health care services – consolidated the expansion of social protection schemes to previously-excluded private sector employees. At this point, the State was committed to providing the requisite conditions for the emergence of wage earners and a stable middle class (CRES 2016, 28).
In the early 1970s, the employment strategy was driven by the adoption of a development model based on an export promotion strategy and an active integration into the international division of labour. The wages were then ruled by an economy that was geared towards competitiveness on the international market. In order to promote a social climate that would be conducive to economic development, while avoiding workers’ trade unions’ opposition, the Hedi Nouira Government (1970-1980) launched negotiations with the two main trade unions, namely the General union of Tunisian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens – UGTT) and the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade, and Craft (Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat – UTICA). These negotiations resulted in the establishment of a collective agreement framework in the private sector in 1973, which was followed by a series of sectoral agreements. However, progress in the protection of private sector workers under this framework, such as the extension of paid annual leave and other social benefits, was accompanied by a policy of work flexibilisation and salary rationalisation. In the context of economic liberalisation, these collective agreements eventually resulted in the enhancement of employers’ capacity to manage human capital costs, especially in the industry and commerce sectors. In terms of social protection coverage, these agreements deepened the already existing inequalities between workers of the public and the private sectors. Until today, the former enjoy better work and social security conditions when compared to the latter, and discrepancies exist in the retirement pension calculation, pension floors, as well as in the duration of paid leave or maternity leave, and in the levels of salary compensation.
In the same movement, successive amendments to the Social Security Code (SSC) and to the Labour Code have been made to expand the categories of employment covered by the contributory system, and to include other previously-excluded sectors. For example, the short-term workers in the agricultural sector were included into the SSC through the adoption of a social security scheme specific to the sector in 1981. However, these efforts resulted in a scattered social security system composed by disarticulated, independent regimes. So far, the social security system has also failed to integrate self-employed workers, especially among low-income categories. For example, the Law 2002-32 on the protection coverage of self-employed workers was an attempt to target small farmers and fishermen, domestic workers, artisans’ piecework, etc. who were excluded from the already-existing social protection regimes. However, it was not appealing to the workers since they could not afford the contributory rate set by the Law 2002-32. As mentioned by some studies, Law 2002-32’s provisions “would be more suitable for precarious wage workers” (CRES 2016, 31) than self-employed ones. In 2012, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) highlighted the coverage gap in the social security legislation, where “the population not yet covered by social security legislation include casual and seasonal agricultural workers, domestic employees, home-helpers, religious officials, and the unemployed” (Hagerman 2015, 7).
In addition, the level of pensions awarded under the mandatory social security schemes remains low, and some of the affiliates are considered to be below the poverty threshold. According to the World Bank Poverty Test, a third of those affiliated to a social security scheme in Tunisia in 2017 were below the poverty threshold (Mestiri 2017). That same year, 76.6% of retired people in Tunisia received a pension below the national minimum wage (Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel Garanti – SMIG) (Mestiri 2017).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Labour Code hardly provides unemployment coverage. The Social Protection Law for Dismissed Workers (1996) has a very restrictive scope as it concerns dismissal for technological or economic reasons (for example, when companies are facing financial hardship). It is the only legislative measure protecting workers from dismissal until today.
Unequal access to social protection benefits and services can be also assessed through an analysis of the access to healthcare services. Since the 1980s, the development of a two-tier medical system was blatant. Private healt care services were only available for privileged categories such as public sector employees who had access to the optional cost reimbursement scheme of the CNRPS, or for a minority of private sector workers who could afford complementary (voluntary) contributory schemes. Moreover, the private healthcare sector was excluded from the mandatory healthcare coverage (Chayata 2013, 16). Thus, it was in the name of a “national solidarity” claimed by the presidential speech, that the government eventually carried out a structural reform of the health protection system, which included discussions with the trade unions. The reform process led to the establishment of the Health Insurance Fund (CNAM) in 2004. It was meant to adapt health coverage to a diversity of situations in the public and private sectors, and aimed at ensuring access to health services independently from any affiliation to the social security schemes. However, these legislative and institutional efforts to build universal health coverage resulted in a system that was still still very much linked to formal employment and social security affiliation. In 2019, 17% of the Tunisian population had no access to any form of health-related social protection (CRES and MoSA 2019). This figure encompasses taxable persons not registered with the CNSS (8.9%); unemployed persons (5.6%); poor families who do not benefit from medical assistance; and workers in the informal sector (2.6%).
The non-contributory system
The non-contributory system was first developed to offset the impact of the neoliberal economy, and eventually to address the shortcomings of the contributory social security schemes.
In the first two decades following Tunisia’s independence from French rule, state-oriented economic developmentalism constituted the blueprint of the Bourguiba-led Desturian Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Desturien – PSD) (Ruf 1975). The introduction of subsidies on a wide range of basic commodities through the establishment of the General Compensation Fund (Caisse Générale de Compensation – [CGC)] in 1970 was among the key social policies that were implemented during that period. In Tunisia, like in several other countries of the MENA region, subsidies constituted, and still constitute, the only universal social policy other than primary – and, in the case of Tunisia, secondary – education (Harris 2019, 195). From the mid-1970s onwards, however, Tunisia was committed to a market-based approach, implementing structural adjustment policies (1986) that culminated in the first reform of the CGC, and namely, in the removal of subsidies on basic commodities. Far from constituting “bread and butter revolts” (Thompson 1963), the bread riots of 1983-1984 reflected the deterioration of a broader social contract in which the state was supposed to guarantee “the fair value of bread” (Dakhli and Bonnecase 2021) and of basic needs in a context of social and economic distress that was linked to the implementation of neoliberal reforms. As K. Harris notes, “low prices for commodities became understood as citizenship rights, not state privileges” (2019, 197).
It is precisely in this context of economic duress and social unrest that the government introduced the first national social assistance programme in 1986, the PNAFN, which was meant to counterbalance the socioeconomic impact of the neoliberal turn of Tunisian political economy on households' purchasing power. In 1991, the PNAFN was followed by the Free Healthcare Assistance programme (Assistance Médicale Gratuite – AMG), which also targeted the most deprived. As it has been argued, however, access to these programmes and their administrative procedures has long depended on the clientelist logic of Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes (Hibou 2015), rather than on the strict application of the technical eligibility criteria. The PNAFN and the AMG remain the main operational mechanisms of the non-contributory social protection system, which merged into the Amen Social Programme under the organic Law No. 10 of 30 January 2019. The programme aims at expanding social assistance to a higher number of qualifying households, and eventually, at replacing the PNAFN. Moreover, the founding of these social assistance programmes depends on the availability of budgets designed on previously-set national population quota (30% in the case of the Amen Social). Therefore, social assistance programmes run the risk of leaving behind a large number of vulnerable populations, the very populations that they are meant to target in the first place.
The Ben Ali regime’s (1987-2011) propaganda was largely based on the development of new assistance programmes towards the poorest. These programmes were officially set up in order to mitigate socioeconomic inequalities, especially in the inland regions, which are historically less developed areas, and in the most deprived urban areas of the country. The National Solidarity Fund (Fond de Solidarité Nationale – FSN), established in 1992, is an example of how the Ben Ali regime was displaying the needs of a redistributive programme both to lift the taxes on all social groups within society and to further restrain the territory through clientelistic practices. On the one hand, the FSN was funded through donations that were formally “voluntary,” but were actually mandatory, as several forms of pressure were displayed by the regime to push reluctant donors to comply with Ben Ali’s solidarity policies (Hibou 2006). On the other hand, in the poorest regions, the FSN was used to provide local authorities with resources to pay and feed their clientele with social assistance (Hibou 2015, 106). According to Hibou, the FSN was “above all an expression of a political logic that corrected imbalances less than it controlled the population, normalised behaviour [...] and punished potential recalcitrant.” Consistently with the deterioration of job opportunities throughout the 1990s, especially among – but not limited to – university-educated youth, the government introduced active labour market programs (Programmes Actifs du Marché du Travail – PAMT) run by the National Employment Fund (Fonds National de l’Emploi – FNE) beginning in the year 2000. However, the ALMPs appear to have a minimal impact on the labour market in Tunisia, mirrored by low insertion rates (DTUDA 2020, 4). According to some studies, their impact was limited by the absence of an integrated approach to demand within the supply and demand chain, and by the fact that stand-alone supply interventions were unlikely to increase employment rates if firms were not creating more job opportunities (DTUDA 2020).
Accumulated social, political, and economic issues exploded during the 2010-2011 uprising that culminated with the fall of the Ben Ali regime on 14 January 2011. Along with the denunciation of corruption, clientelism, and the regime’s law enforcement services’ brutality, demands for social justice and dignity brought together a wide range of actors, and constituted a central common denominator of the Tunisian uprising. In the socioeconomic arena, previously sectorised claims and material demands expressed throughout a wide range of mobilisation found a common ground in the winter of 2010-2011 (Allal 2012). The multisectoral mobilisations (Dobry 1987) that followed the self-immolation of the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, whose wares were confiscated, and who was humiliated and harassed by the police, led to the first of a long series of unprecedented uprisings and social movements in the Arab region.
In the period between the 2011 Tunisian revolution and the elections of 2014, political conflicts and struggles for power have taken centre stage in the public and political arena. In this context, the so-called social contract of 2013 signed by a quartet of civil society organisations (including the main trade unions) has been largely placed aside. This contract included, in particular, a commitment to revise the social security system and establish a better governance in the management of social funds and financial balances. The governmental instability and the economic deterioration (economic slowdown, devaluation of the Tunisian Dinar) characterising the post-revolutionary period has led to the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the country beginning in 2011. Structural adjustment policies and so-called prior actions (PA) required by the IMF have led to the implementation of austerity reforms and the contraction of public spending. The priority given to the restructuring of a highly indebted economy has hindered structural social policy reforms. In the framework of social protections, this has favoured an emergency-based approach and the development of targeted safety net programmes, in line with IMF and World Bank (WB) recommendations. Successive governments have implemented time-bounded safety net programmes such as the Amal programme in 2011 (“amal” meaning “hope” in Arabic), or social assistance programmes like the so-called Amen Social (“amen” meaning “security/social safety” in Arabic) in 2019. The latter has been followed by exceptional socioeconomic measures during the Covid-19 pandemic targeting young unemployed graduates, the elderly, and children. However, in the context of an increasing influence of international and financial institutions such as the IMF and the WB, the social welfare policy has been more and more driven by the view of experts and financial solutions rather than structural rights-based social policies. To that end, the approach WB or the Centre des Recherches et des Etudes Sociales (CRES), among others, understands the non-contributory system in terms of performance and improvement of its efficiency and coverage, and is based on a conception of poverty reduction that belongs to the international standards of funding agencies. Yet, the Tunisian government is discussing a more structural reform of the social protection schemes to solve the gaps of the current social protection system. As of 2019, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) has moved towards building a (still to be implemented) Social Protection Floor programme to expand the social protection coverage to populations that remain excluded from it to this day. This programme is considering a minimum income for unemployed individuals, the elderly, and children (CRES and MoSA 2019, 5).
Experts’ debates on the CGC reform have intensified, moving towards the elimination of this universal protection tool in the medium-term. The CGC is criticised as a regressive and financially unsustainable mechanism with an unequal impact on low-income and high-income households (World Bank 2015). However, it has been argued that it still has a positive impact when it comes to limiting the risk of the middle-class to fall into poverty (Makhlouf 2017). Moreover, according to some economists (Bedoui and Derbali 2021), it appears that the State’s subsidies on basic commodities are instrumental in supporting the subsistence of the middle and working classes, i.e. of the majority to the labour force. Overall, the question of reforming the CGC has revolved around financial and technical issues, while the political and social consequences of its removal have been largely overlooked (Jouili 2021). Since 2013, the IMF prior actions (PA) have included the reform of the CGC in order to grant loans to Tunisia. In parallel to the reform of the CGC, which translates into its progressive elimination, the IMF recommends the implementation of targeted programmes addressing the poorest households in line with the pro-poor approach fostered by international financial institutions. According to the rapporteur of the Finance Committee in Parliament, the amount allocated to the compensation fund for the year 2021 is 3,100 MD (against 750MD in 2010): 2,200 MD of which are allocated towards commodities; 500 MD towards transport; and 400 MD towards fuel.
Concluding remarks
The structuring of the social protection system in Tunisia has always expressed a tension between an economic policy geared towards competitiveness on the international market, and the need for preservation of the social peace within the country. The result has been the establishment of complex and disarticulated contributory schemes that foster inequalities between the different categories of eligible workers on the one hand; and on the other, the implementation of assistance programmes targeting the poorest which intensified from the 1990s onwards, revealing the impact of a flagging economy on the pauperised populations. In particular, the critical situation of the unemployed youth is reflected in a series of employability programmes that have been enhanced after the 2011 revolution, a albeit little impact.
In a context of high levels of unemployment (18% [INS 2021]) and informality (45% [INS 2020]), the employment-based contributory social security system tends to rule out a wide range of citizens excluded from the contributory system. The high rates of unemployment and informality in the country not only impact the pay-as-you-go system, which is underfinanced; they also translate into the exclusion of significant proportions of the working population from the social security coverage, pushing them to address the non-contributory social assistance programmes. Furthermore, unemployment and lack of social protections hinder the construction of a strong social contract in the Tunisia of the post-revolution era.
Bibliography
Allal, Amin. 2012. “Trajectoires ‘révolutionnaires’ en Tunisie, processus de radicalisations politiques 2007-2011.” Revue Française de Science Politique 5-6/62: 821-841.
Belhaj, Ferid. January 2021. “MENA Unbound: Ten Years after the Arab Spring, Avoiding Another Lost Decade.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2021/01/14/mena-unbound-ten-ye... [last consulted March 16, 2022].
Ben Cheikh, Nidhal. May 2013. “L’extension de la protection sociale à l’économie informelle à l’épreuve de la transition en Tunisie.” Centre des Recherches et des Études Sociales (CRES).
Chaabane, Mohamed. 2003. “Towards the universalization of social security: The experience of Tunisia.” ESS Paper no. 4, International Labour Organization.
Chayata, Karim. 2013. “La prise en charge des dépenses de santé par la solidarité nationale : l’exemple tunisien du système d’assurance maladie.” PhD diss., Université de Rennes 1.
Centre de Recherches Économiques et Sociales (CRES). May 2016. “Protection sociale et économie informelle en Tunisie, Défis de la transition vers l’économie formelle.”
CRES and MoSA (Tunisian Ministry of Social Affairs). May 2019. “Étude de faisabilité des garanties du Socle National de Protection Sociale – Résumé exécutif.”
_______ May 2017. “Évaluation de la performance des programmes d’assistance sociale en Tunisie : pour optimiser le ciblage des pauvres et freiner l’avancée de l’informalité.” Rapport de l’enquête d’évaluation.
Dakhli, Leyla. 2011. “The Fair Value of Bread: Tunisia, 28 December 1983-6 January 1984.” International Review of Social History. 66 (S29): 41-68.
Dakhli, Leyla and Vincent Bonnecase. 2021, “Introduction: Interpreting the Global Economy through Local Anger”, International Review of Social History. 66 (S29): 1-21.
Derbali, Manel. 14 July 2021. “La caisse de compensation, un casse-tête tunisien.” Nawaat. https://nawaat.org/2021/07/14/caisse-de-compensation-un-casse-tete-tunis...
Dobry, Michel. 1987. Sociologie des crises politiques : La dynamique des mobilisations multisectorielles. Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale de sciences politiques.
DTUDA (Danish Trade Union Development Agency, “Labour Market Profile Tunisia – 2020.” Denmark.
ECSWA (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia). 2021, “Targeted social protection in Arab countries before and during the Covid-19 crisis.” ECSWA, Beirut.
_______ 2016. Social Protection Country Profile: Tunisia. ESCWA, Beirut.
ERF (Economic Research Forum). 2022, Conference: “National Dialogue on The Social Protection System in Tunisia.” Tunis, 24-25 January 2022.
_______ 2022a. Minh, Phuong Le, Marouani, Mohamed Ali, and Ben Cheikh, Nidhal, “Health Insurance and Health Outcomes in Tunisia.”
_______ 2022b, Nasri, Khaled, Amara, Mohamed and Helmy, Imane, “The landscape of Social Protection in Tunisia.”
Hagerman, Katharine. 2015. “Social Protection and Safety Nets in Tunisia.” Institute of Development Studies, Centre for Social Protection, World Food Programme (WFP).
Hammami, Med Dhia. 29 May 2014. “Les B.A.BA de la Caisse Générale de Compensation.” (https://nawaat.org/2014/05/29/tunisie-les-b-a-ba-de-la-caisse-generale-d...)
Harris, Kevan. 2019. “The Social Question in the Middle East. Past and Present.” In The Social Question in the Twenty-First Century. A global View edited by Jan Breman, Kevan Harris, Ching Kwan Lee, and Marcel van der Linden, 188-207. Oakland: University of California Press.
Hibou, Béatrice. 2015. “La formation asymétrique de l’Etat en Tunisie.” In L'État d’injustice sociale au Maghreb edited by Bono, Irene, Béatrice Hibou, Hamza Meddeb, and Mohamed Tozy, 100-149. Paris: Éditions Karthala.
______ 2011. “Macroéconomie et domination politique en Tunisie : du ‘miracle économique’ benaliste aux enjeux socio-économiques du moment révolutionnaire.” Politique africaine, Vol. 4, no. 124, p. 127-154.
______ 2006. La force de l'obéissance. Économie politique de la répression en Tunisie. Paris: La Découverte.
ILO (International Labour Organisation). 2011. “Tunisia: a new social contract for fair and equitable growth.” Studies on growth with equity. International Institute for Labour Studies.
_______ 2017. “World Social Protection Report, 2017-2019.”
_______ 2019. “Étude de Faisabilité d’un fonds perte d’emploi (options et coûts).” International Labour Organization.
_______ 2021. “World Social Protection Report 2020-2022: Regional companion report for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region.” International Labour Organization.
INS (Tunisian National Institute of Statistics). 2021. “Indicateurs de l’emploi et du chômage du troisième trimestre 2021.”
http://www.ins.tn/publication/indicateurs-de-lemploi-et-du-chomage-trois... [last consulted 23 March 2022].
_______ 2020. “Indicateurs du travail informel pour l’année 2019” (in Arabic):
http://ins.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/Note%2520emploi%2520in... [last consulted 23 March 2022].
Jouili, Moustapha. 2021. “La Caisse Générale de Compensation en Tunisie: impasse d’un mécanisme de régulation artificiel.” Mondes en développement. Vol. 4, no. 196, p. 123-140.
Longuenesse, Elisabeth, Catusse, Myriam and Destremau Blandine. January 2005. “Le travail et la question sociale au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient.” Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée (REMMM), no. 105-106, p. 15-43.
Mansuy, Michèle and Werquin, Patrick. 2015. “Labour Market Entry in Tunisia: The gender gap.” International Labour Office, Geneva.
Makhlouf, Slaheddine. May 2017. “La Caisse Générale de Compensation.” Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques (ITES).
Mestiri, Mhamed. 14 April 2017. “Système de Protection sociale : la Fabrique des Inégalités.” Nawaat. https://nawaat.org/2017/04/14/systeme-de-protection-sociale-la-fabrique-...
MoSA (Ministry of Social Affairs). Unicef, CRES. 2019. “La garantie d’une allocation pour enfants en Tunisie, faisabilité, coût, impact et financement.”
Ruf, Werner K. 1975, XVII. “Le socialisme tunisien : conséquences d’une expérience avortée” In Introduction à l’Afrique du Nord contemporaine. Institut de recherches et d’études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans (IREMAM), Aix-en-Provence.
SEFF (Secrétariat d’Etat aux Affaires de la Femme et de la Famille). UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women). OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2014. “Étude sur le travail des femmes en milieu rural et leur accès à la protection sociale.”
Walton, John K. and Seddon, David. 1994. Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
World Bank. May 2016. “Tunisia Moves to Modernize its Social Protection and Labor Policies.”
______ December 2015. “Consolidating social protection and labor policy in Tunisia: Building systems, connecting to jobs.” Policy Note, Maghreb Department MENA, World Bank Group.
______ May 2014. “La révolution inachevée, Créer des opportunités, des emplois de qualité et de la richesse pour tous les Tunisiens.” Revue des Politiques de Développement, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department Middle East and North Africa Region.