Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

Publication Date: 
February, 2015

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

Founding Date: 
August, 1945
Founder: 
Colonel Fouad Chehab
HQ: 
Yarzeh, Lebanon

Origins

1916: Lebanese troops first armed within the French “Legion of the Orient”.
1920: Under the post-WWI mandate, France formed the “Army of the Levant”, thereafter reorganised in the “Special Troops of the Levant”, composed of both Lebanese and Syrian personnel.
1926: Creation of the “Lebanese First Sharp Shooter Unit”, considered as the precursor of the modern LAF.
1943: The various military units were combined in the Fifth Brigade and put under the Command of Colonel Fouad Chehab. Following the declaration of independence, the “Lebanese Third Sharp Shooter Unit”, under British control, were handed over to the Lebanese government. 
August 1st, 1945: The majority of the LAF which remained under French control was placed under full Lebanese authority. Under the commandment of General Chehab, the LAF evolved in terms of its internal organisation and defence doctrine.*

Commander

General Joseph Aoun (since 2017)

General Jean Kahwagi (2008 to 2017);

General Michel Sleiman (1998 to 2008).

Chief of Staff

Major General P.S.C.1 Walid Salman (2011 to present);

Major General P.S.C. Shawki Al Masri (2005 to 2011).

Mission

The primary goal of the LAF is the promotion of internal security and stability. It is empirically verified by the strong visibility of the Lebanese Army in the public sphere (and not solely in strategic locations).2 However, its official missions broadly include:

- facing the Israeli occupation and its recurrent breaches of Lebanese sovereignty in South Lebanon and West Bekaa and ensuring its complete withdrawal to the internationally recognised borders;

- confronting external and internal threats to vital national interests and security, and to the fullest extent possible, remaining neutral vis-a-vis regional and international politics, by systematically adopting a defensive stance;

- coordinating with Arab armies in accordance with ratified treaties and agremments;

- engaging, in accordance with national interests, in social and development activities;

- undertaking relief operations in coordination with other public and humanitarian institutions;

- being a neutral actor in the face of confessionalist and political dissensions in the country.3

Strategy

During the civil war, the security scene was mainly occupied by militias as the popular expression of communities sense of insecurity. Within this this militian security system, the LAF was considered as one of many security actors rather than the sole or dominant one, hence preventing its fomulation of a national strategy for the defence of Lebanon. Thereafter, between 1990 and 2005, the regional factor of Syria prevented the LAF to establish an independent defence strategy. Since 2005, the successive governments have failed to precisely define the role of the LAF and other actors on the national security scene, hence forcing the institution to adopt an ad hoc modus operandi. Many restraining factors constrain the strategic decisions of the LAF, notably its lack of “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” and its failure to enforce effective control over the whole territory, and ensure its defence.4

Structure

Structure of the LAF: ground forces, air forces, navy.

Structure of the ground forces: 5 Regional Commands, 11 Mechanised brigades, 5 Special Forces regiments, 1 Republican Guard brigade, 1 Commando regiment, 1 Airborne regiment, 1 Navy Commando regiment, 2 Artillery regiments, Combat Support units (including Medical Services, Support brigade, Logistics brigade, Military police, Independent work regiment).

Structure of the LAF embodies the confessional system in Lebanon: Maronite Army Commander, Druze Chief of Staff, Military Council encompasses the Army Commander, the Chief of Staff and 4 generals representing the Sunnis, Shi’a, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic.   

 Allies

United States: since the mid-1990s there has been a clear policy aiming at developing the LAF, however this is done in a manner that will not make it a real threat for Israel, the major US-ally in the Levant, e.g. light artillery, transportation means...5

Saudi Arabia: a recent $3 billion grant which allowed Lebanon to conclude an arms deal with France.6

United Arab Emirate: provides arms to develop LAF’s capabilities.7

Russia: arms grant in 2010,8 recently news of military cooperation as to combat terrorist threat.9

France: $3 billion-worth arms deal;10 formation and training of non-commissioned officers and officers.11

United Kingdom: $16 million-worth arms donation, to support the LAF in its fight against jihadists threats on its Eastern border.12

Iran: arms donations.13

Syria: training of officers in Syrian military school, arms donation, however this was significant especially during the Syrian occupation (1976-2005), and despite the decline of this cooperation since, it is a strong taboo within the LAF.14

Sphere of influence

Its influence extends over the whole territory of Lebanon, however it is central to note that the LAF does not hold the “monopoly over the use of legitimate violence”. The “Resistance”, primarily embodied in Hezbollah, also controls certain area of the sovereign territory, though this armed presence does not contradict that of the LAF: some argue there is a strategy of cooperation by avoidance,15 others speak of a “duopole” on legitimate violence.16 The coexistence of two armed entities on the Lebanese territory has been increasingly normalised, regardless of their spatial proximity. The division of spheres of influence is not geographical but concerns the role played by each actor.17

Number of troops

1975: 20,000 men;

1994: 40,000 men;

2004: 60,000 men;

2005: 65,000 men;18

Today: between 60,000 and 70,000 men.19

Soft power tools

Strong external communication services led by the Lebanese Army Command’s Guidance Directorate,20 presence on social media, mobile app,  etc.21

Status

Active.

Website

http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/

History & Politics

Historically, the LAF, like the Lebanese society, has represented a delicate confessional balance. During the first months of the civil war, the weak military institution proved unable to ease the tensions between the different Lebanese communities and prevent outbreaks of violence, and the creation of armed militias.22

Following the invasions of both the Israeli and Syrian armies, a restructuration plan to create a 12-brigades 60,000-men army was announced by President Amin Jumayyil, convinced of the need for a unified national army to restore peace in the country. To overcome the sectarian divisions at the core of the civil war, the army - and especially the higher echelons of its chain of command - was to structurally and intristincally commit to a Lebanese rather than a sectarian or communal identity. Hence, by 1983, with the appointment of Lt. Gen. lbrahim Tannous as Army Commander, most senior commanders and officials had been replaced in a partisan-free manner. This restructuration was part of the American-sponsored Bartlett plan, which aimed at reorganising and rapidly expanding and arming the manpower of the military apparatus. However, both the 1976 and 1983 attempts to reconstruct the army have not been completely successful as the armed forces remained dependent on both Israeli and Syrian political games.

In 1983 and 1984, the LAF desintegrated along confessional lines during the battles of the Shuf mountains as many soldiers and officers, including the Chief of Staff General Nadim al Hakim, defected to join the opposing Druzes, as their coreligionsits. Until the end of the civil war, the army was torn by elements abandoning the national institution to pledge allegiance to communal and sectarian militias. Some scholars, such as Elizabeth Picard, actually argued that during the civil war, the national military institution perfectly represented the “state of destruction” of the Lebanese State.23

Following the 1990 Taif Agreement and the departure of General Aoun, the army was rebuilt in its current form by the pro-Syrian government, and Commander Emile Lahoud. It was to embody the power-sharing nature of the Taif Agreement, and symbolise national integrity and patriotism. However, “negative peace” - as the absence of war - was reached only following inter-sectarian combats, and most centrally inter-Christian strifes which reached East Beirut. After a ceasefire was reached in May, General Aoun, pushed by Syrian troops and that of Emile Lahoud, was forced to flee to the French embassy and instruct his units to join the commandment of Lahoud. From this date on, the attempt to reconstruct the army became clearly discernible, as the Lebanese Forces and other militias were supposedly dissolving, however it was impaired by the Syrian control over the country. By 1992, 26% of the national budget was dedicated to the reconstruction of the army, its rearmament and professionalisation, and centrally the reintegration of former militiamen, as enshrined in the Taif Accords (approximately 6,000 of them).24 Additionally, there appeared to be a clear desire to reach a confessional balance: this is notable within the officer corps which counted 232 resignations by 1991. To overcome suspicions of the government attempting to create an imbalance to the detriments of Christians, Defence Minister Michel Murr made the confession of officers public. The choice of recruits also seemed to aim at ensuring a confessional balance, however due to differences in the sects’ demographic growth rates and the diminished attraction of Christians towards military careers, by 1992 about 3,100 Christians were missing to reach a balance. Additionally, several steps are taken by the Army Command to put an end to the quasi confessional homogeneity of brigades, including blending them with each other, with the realistic end of reaching a 70/30 Muslim to Christian ratio.25  Despite the attempts to shape the LAF into a nationalisasing social institution, within the ranks, allegiances were still primarily pledged to individuals’ communities. As to strengthen the Army as a symbol of national unity, conscription was implemented in 1974, although only entered into force in 1993 and was ultimately put to a halt in 2007.26 

Despite the limited capacities of the LAF, higher echelons of the chain of command received training from Saint Cyr, West Point, and centrally in Homs and Aleppo.27 Syrian influence over the military was far-reaching during its occupation of the country: it centrally aimed at restructuring and reunifying it, but not strengthening it.28 However it should be noted that the extent of the Syrian infuence over the LAF is still a taboo. Structurally, it is primarily visible in the growth of the moukhabrat’s role and the multiplication of the security apparatus’ organs.29

In 2006, thanks to the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli troops, the LAF managed to gain a momentum: its influence extended to the Southern part of the country and it adopted an offensive posture towards internal destabilisating forces. Most centrally, it renewed its commitment to the Chehabist principle of neutrality, both sectarian and political, truly making the institution the “school of the nation”.30 This was especially clear in General Sleiman’s refusal to follow governmental orders and military intervene against the collective civil demonstrations triggered by the assassination of Hariri. As argued by Emma Soubrier, this event represented an important step in the army’s attempt to overcome interferences when orders from the government clash with its fundational principles.

More recently, during the 2006 war, the role of the army was largely characterised as passive, which was arguably mainly explained by the short levels and obsolescence of its material and armament. However, the renewed efficacy of the LAF since its 2005 reedification was notably exemplified by the 2007 crisis in the Palestinian refugee camp of the Nahr al Bared. The operation was primarily anti-terrorist, encompassed in a rhetoric of national protection but also “protection of the Palestinian brothers” victim of extremism. This constitutes another example of the independence of the army vis-à-vis the government when the former deems it necessary, and of its strength and unity. During the 3-month campaign, of which the LAF came out victorious, the latter strengthened its popular support by adopting an offensive stance,31 although  the subsequent destruction of the Nahr el Bared camp raised questions on the methods of the army by many civil society actors and human rights defensors. 

Until today, the role of the army is still primarily that of preserving internal security, which is confirmed by the extent of its visibility in the public sphere.32 Indeed, the LAF has grown to hold a prominent role in internal Lebanese dynamics, though its regional engagement has largely remained peripheral or forced since the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Domestically, it has acted as a nationalising force, a national institution with a strong capacity of social organisation: an entity meant to rise above inter-sectarian tensions and divides. Some scholars argue the importance of the LAF for Lebanese lies within its inaction rather than its actions due to fears of disturbing the confessionial balance.33

Today the LAF still face three central challenges: (a) its need to gain independence from external powers by strengthening its military capacity (b) its need to acquire the means to truly become a national army and (c) its need to empower itself and represent a model for the rest of Lebanese institutions as to make way for the development of a strong and united nation-State.

 
Notable events

 

[Last updated on Mars 29th, 2017]