

I- Introduction

The July war 2006, lasted 34 days, and led to the displacement of 915,762 (almost 25% of the Lebanese population) persons, relocating into public and private schools all over the country. With the coming into force of the cease fire in August 14th 2006, there was a rapid return of the displaced to the south. Those whose homes were destroyed stayed at relatives or rented homes in less-affected villages.

The war left behind it substantial impact on all levels, the estimate costs for the direct physical damage of the war on Lebanon counts up to 3,612 million US Dollars. 66.6% of the amount in damage is concentrated in housing and commercial spaces, and 13.4% is concentrated in Transportation. In Addition the CDR preliminary assessment indicates that 137 roads (630Km) have been damaged and 107 bridges and overpasses have been damaged or destroyed. The impact on the health sector has been three-fold: damage to health facilities and infrastructure, lack of access and epidemic risks and exhaustion of supplies. In addition the key damages observed by the JRC and EUSC in S Lebanon can be summarized as follows: 1489 buildings, 535 road sections, 21 of the 29 bridges over Litani River and 545 cultivated fields were destroyed or damaged with an estimated impacted population of up to 15,500 (Source: *Joint JRC and EUSC assessment of damage*)

The following table provides a damage assessment based on preliminary estimates from the Council for Development and Reconstruction.

CDR Damage Assessment Figures By Field

Field	Total Damages (US\$ millions)
Transport	484
Electricity	244
Telecommunications	116
Water	80
Health and Education	34
Housing & commercial spaces	2,406
Industry	220
Military	16
Fuel Distribution Stations	12
TOTAL	3,612

Source: www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb

Although the damage was considerably high, there was a fast transition between the emergency phase and the recovery phase, only one month after the cease fire took place, the returnees were able to sustain their basic needs, numerous reports show that this fast transition is due to the fast dispatching of cash-subsidies (Support of Temporarily and semi-permanent shelter) and Food Aid for the displaced population by Major UN, international, Governmental and Non-Governmental Agencies. In addition due to the long situation of Occupation before the year 2000, the South Lebanon population have developed high coping mechanisms, families relying on the larger family network for support.

Although emergency needs diminished rapidly, there was a growing need on the level of rehabilitation and recovery, especially related to infrastructure and service provisions on all sectors, not to count reconstruction. The rehabilitation and recovery phase revealed pre-existing problems related to poor service-provision infrastructure, and lack of sectoral planning, which have pushed for a Unitarian organization of services rather than needs based organization of services.

For example, in the educational sector there are schools where the number of students per classroom is quite low, and other schools where the number of students per classroom exceeds the normal rates. Some schools lack teachers and others that have abundance in teachers. This example is true in most sectors, and such distribution of services is resulting in the dropping of the quality of services.

Although some recovery and rehabilitation projects have looked into this matter and tried to readjust services to the needs, with the absence of any general developmental plans, we can notice that such re-orientation of service provision necessities interventions on the national level in strategy and policy-making.

II- Methodology of Study

The analysis, have looked into two main sources of information, one side will be NGOs, INGOs UN agencies and governmental bodies that are acting in the different sectors of rehabilitation and recovery activities in South Lebanon, the second source of information are municipalities and local government bodies, which can act here as representatives of the local communities. Both of these sources will hopefully be able to provide a less biased and a more accurate picture of the current progress and needs in the area.

While the first source of information consists of secondary resources published by intervening entity and in depth interviews, the second source consists of data gathered by Lebanon Support field officers in the above listed cazas. Theses interviews that were held intend to give a general sense of the current damage impact and the progress in the different cazas from the point of municipalities and local governments. This information is useful in consolidating (or reinforcing) the data obtained form published reports and in-depth interviews.

Lebanon Support held three focus group sessions attended by representatives of the major local and international NGOs contributing to the postwar interventions in South Lebanon. The focus Group session took place in Le Meridian Commodore Hotel from the 22nd till the 24th of February 2008. The three sessions addressed the following general themes or fields of interventions:

Session 1: Watsan, infrastructure and shelter

Session 2: Economic situation with a focus on the agricultural sector

Session 3: Education and Health Sectors in South Lebanon

III- Main Results

- A. There was a considerable improvement and progress in the rehabilitation and recovery efforts in south Lebanon, yet there are many gaps especially located in the economic, reconstruction and agricultural sector.
- B. One of the major issue to be tackled is the lack of any developmental strategies in south Lebanon which renders the transition from recovery to development quite challenging
- C. The recent market fluctuations as well as the lack of Prices-Control of reconstruction materials pushed many families to be unable to fully recover and to be stuck in debt
- D. The delay in dispatching the second batch of payments related to reconstruction is a real obstacle facing the recovery process in South Lebanon
- E. The lack of political and economic stability on the national level is implicating negative signs on the progress of rehabilitation towards development in South Lebanon
- F. The lack of comprehensive and general needs baseline in south Lebanon renders the recovery phase unable to consider pre-existing problems and unable to re-orient services on needs-basis.
- G. There are no comprehensive statistics on the number of vulnerable population in South Lebanon, the last vulnerability assessment was conducted by Samidoun Relief Campaign in October 2006, which estimated the rate of extreme vulnerability to be about 0.3% of the South Population (Assessment Covering 50 Villages in South Lebanon with an estimate of resident population of 42,514)
- H. Lack of developmental exit strategies for recovery projects, which render the situation more vulnerable to upcoming challenges

WATER & SANITATION

IV- Water/Sanitation and Infrastructure Sector

A. Water & Sanitation Before the July War

The problems pertaining to Water and Sanitation in South Lebanon are chronic and structural problems that have endured for the last three decades. Problems pertaining to water and sewerage systems networks encompass several aspects namely: the absence of the strategic planning with respect to the provision of these water services, technical problems (accessibility to households, sustainable delivery, and maintenance), and the quality of these services.

Access to sanitation services in South Lebanon is one of the lowest in all of the country, the “Resultat du recensement des immeubles et des etablissements, 1996-1997” estimates the rate to be 22.67%, where in Bekaa it rates up to 29.53% and in Beirut it rates around 93.43% which is the highest in Lebanon.


Yet, access to safe drinking water in south Lebanon ranks as the third highest rate, counting up to 86.35% coming directly after Mount Lebanon (86.98%) and Beirut (92.94%). Source: “Resultat du recensement des immeubles et des etablissements, 1996-1997”

Although these statistics are out of date, and it is expected that there has been a certain progress in accessibility to water and sanitation services over the last 10 years, yet such progress follows a localized pattern based on municipality initiatives, NGOs and private sector. With the absence of a general strategy of provision of water and sanitation services on the national level, and the impact of the July war on the housing and Watsan sectors in south Lebanon, problems of accessibility tend to rise on a national and local level.

The low rates of progress in the agricultural sector in Lebanon an the constant economic instability imposed by wars and conflicts are driving big numbers of the population to leave rural areas and to head to urban ones, which is expected to put more pressure on water and sanitation services in urbanized areas. The rate of annual growth of urban population between 1995 and 2000 was estimated to be about 2.3 while the rural population growth in the same period dropped by 2.17 (rate: - 2.17) [Source: E/ESCWA/HS/1999/7]. This rate is expected to grow in south Lebanon as a direct impact of the July war in 2006.


Water Systems

Residents of South Lebanon access potable and service water through two main sources: wells (rain water collection wells



and artesian wells) and the Public Water Network. About 64% of the residents of South Lebanon Mouhafaza use the public network as a main water source for potable water while 18.8% use Mineral Water and 10.9% use Artesian Wells

Where 66% of the residents of Nabatiyeh Mouhafaza, use the public network for potable water, and 12.2% use Mineral Water and 2.90% use Artesian Wells. As for Service Water, In South Lebanon Mouhafaza 77.2% of the residents use the public network compared to 16.4% who use Artesian Wells; As for the Nabatiyeh Mouhafaza 85.5% use the public network compared to 3.5% who use artisan wells.



Although the public water network covers a high percentage of the residents, the quality and quantity of provided water provided is disputable.

Water samples collected from all over Lebanon in 2006/2007 were analyzed for physical, chemical and bacteriological parameters in the environmental core lab at the American University of Beirut. The results were compared to national standards in addition to international standards.

The Results for South Lebanon were: “Contamination with wastewater was detected in all samples. Water disposal systems are not properly drained, this need immediate attention. Another problem faced in the South is that the use of fertilizers is causing the eutrophication of the fresh water.”

Main Sources of Pollution

One source of pollution is hygiene pits. Wastewater in most residential units in Southern towns and villages is disposed in manholes, which are not are not constructed along poor standards (such as not having concrete beds); the fact that causes leakage to underground water and artesian wells.

Another source of pollution is exiting sewerage systems which are established in proximity to water distribution networks. The old pipes, which constitute wastewater disposal leak into the water system and hence contaminate potable water distributed to households.

Another source of pollution, is the distribution network itself, usually consisting of metal pipes. Ideally, metal pipes should be replaced every 15 years. However, the pipes used in the distribution networks lack consistent and periodic maintenance, thus becoming vulnerable to rust formation, not to mention that metallic pipes contain high levels of lead, a highly poisonous element for humans.

Moreover, potable water is contaminated because of manhole leakage. Added to this, the high level of calcium, algae, and microbic cultures, in spring water causes major health problems.

Most households in Southern villages use metal reservoirs to supply their residential premises with water tanks and rainwater collection wells. Residents rarely maintain and clean these tanks and wells.

Quantity is another issue, the national estimate for water provision per capita per day counts to 50 Liters (20 litres less than what the WHO says people need) and this rate is expected to fall in the coming years, due to the changes in the climate, where "In all of our old forecasting, we used to say that 90 days represented the normal amount of rainy days... But in the past few years we have been using forecasts assuming between 70-80 rainy days; this year we actually had only 45 days of rain ... It was very abnormal." (Bassem Jaber, program manager at Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), the private company spearheading the Lebanon Water Policy Program at the Energy and Water Ministry, 20 August 2007, The Daily Star)

The expected shortage in water is not the only determinant in provision, yet another one is the irregular provision due to inconsistent/interrupted provision hours in addition to the limited coverage of the distribution network.

Structural Problems

- Water is polluted in all parts of its trajectory from its source to the terminal end of the built residential units. There are several undertaken awareness campaigns, yet the response rate of residents is relatively weak.
- network pipes are rarely maintained, replaced, or repaired
- insufficient supply to households from existing networks electricity cuts hinder residents from receiving water

B. Impact of the July War

The July war aggravated the situation due to a halt in water distribution and sewerage networks. Indeed, the networks were either completely destroyed or severely fractured because of the vibrations that resulted from explosions. Added to this, several water reservoirs were directly targeted and destroyed. In parallel, the intentional damage inflicted on electric supply stations made it impossible to operate water pumps and

chlorination systems. The rain water collection wells were also severely damaged due to constant shelling.

Unit	Number of Damaged/Destroyed Units per Area	
	Number of Units	Area/Location
Reservoirs	57	South Lebanon
Pumps	3	South Lebanon
	3	Qasmieh
Artesian Wells	2	South Lebanon
Network	1465	South Lebanon
	3	Litani

In Addition the General Initial Assessment conducted by the Samidoun Relief Campaign on August 2006, showed that most villages had either been cut out of water due to electricity cut, or to partial and complete damage of water networks, destruction of wells and reservoirs.

C. Interventions and Progress

The main characteristics of the response to Watsan needs were based on two parallel paths; the first was to directly provide water to the population, either through water trucking or through the installation of small and medium capacity generators to reactivate existing water pumps. The second path focused on the rehabilitation of the water networks in South Lebanon.

The rehabilitation process focused on repairing the main water network that connects between the main water sources in south Lebanon and the secondary water sources on the village level, by September 2006, these connections were restored, the secondary water networks which is the network that links the village water sources to houses and dwellings took a longer time to repair, basically focusing on repairing main pipelines between reservoirs and the village main water network, as well as repairing house connections and replacing damaged and destroyed house based water tanks with new ones; Also the rehabilitation process covered the repairs and reconstruction of village reservoirs, the installation of new and the replacement of damaged and destroyed water pumps, and the installation of new generators and the replacement of damaged and destroyed one to enable the water pumps to be activated and to pump water into houses. Also one main activity was the distribution of fuel to villages to fill in generators so to enable them to activate water pumps.

main water networks that connects the main water sources in South Lebanon to villages, and the rehabilitation of main water networks inside of the villages and the secondary connections between main water pipes and networks and house connections

Up to January 2008, the estimate of progress in Potable Water Networks Recovery counts to 87%, and in service water progress counts to 97% with some villages counting very low progress in recovery for example

the rate of recovery of potable water networks in Yater counts to only 20% and in Bint Jbeil it counts to 50%. (Source: Village Survey conducted by Lebanon-Support on a sample of 15 villages in South Lebanon)

Yet Based on the Lebanese Government Statistics published on www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb progress in Watsan Sector shows 99.6% with 89% progress in fixing reservoirs, and 100% of damaged water networks were fixed as well as 100% of artisan wells and pumps were completely rehabilitated.

As part of relief and early recovery interventions, a lot of interventions took the opportunity for addressing problems that predate the July 2006 war, such as replacing the existing metal pipes with plastic pressurized pipes. However, such projects did not cover all needs. Currently the water network in South Lebanon is hybrid between old systems and pipes and new ones, which creates un-equal standards in water systems and water provision.

Although there has been extensive work in rehabilitating water and sanitation networks and services in south Lebanon, we can clearly notice that with already pre-existing low indicators of accessibility to sanitation services, the need of the development of a general development plan of sewage systems and their accessibility is essentially needed

D. Ongoing Projects

1. In several villages, metal water tanks are being replaced with plastic ones this will reduce the pollution hazards of using the metal water tanks that can rust and develop high levels of calcinations.
2. In several villages, existing water tanks that serve residential structure, schools, and other public amenities have been undergoing maintenance and repair. In parallel, intervening bodies are undertaking awareness campaigns that target residents, highlighting the importance of constantly cleaning water tanks and repairing water pipes installations in residences. In addition, some NGOs are working with local residents on replacing metal water tanks with plastic ones.
3. Sewage system have been installed in Srifa

E. Gaps

The main gaps concerning the already completed and ongoing interventions have been the following:

- The problem of water source pollution maintains.
- The raised and assigned budgets only cover repair works. Hence, new metal pipes replaced the old ones used in water distribution and sewerage systems. In very few cases, plastic pipes replaced (which last for thirty years) by metal pipes (which last for fifteen years).
- Lack of need-driven supply management plans

- Low rates of accessibility to sanitation services

F. Recommendations

All these problems and gaps require coming up short term and long term solutions on several levels.

First, there is a pressing need for designing a comprehensive plan by the Water Authority in South Lebanon and the Ministry of Hydraulic and Electric Resources addressing the following problems:

- Development of water and sanitation networks and services
- Replacement of the metal pipes with plastic pipes (public distribution networks)
- Treatment of polluted water sources
- Rehabilitation of Hygiene pits according to hygiene and safe standards
- Better management of water distribution to residential premises
- Better scheduling of provision hours
- Better accessibility to sanitation services

Second, public administrations and NGOs could work with municipalities and residents on solving the problems pertaining to hygiene pits.

Third, intervening agencies and bodies should work with residents on constantly cleaning metal water tanks and replacing them with plastic ones when possible. Agencies involved, have to intensify awareness campaigns and assistance in that regard.


Fourth, in order to reduce water pollution resulting from the plumbing connection of the residential structures, old and deteriorated pipes—especially in old structures—have to be replaced by plastic pipes. The new installations have to comply with sanitary standards that ensure a good quality of potable and usage water.

SHELTER SECTOR

V- Shelter Sector

A. Overview

During the July War, the displaced population reached a peak of 970,000 persons distributed all over Lebanon, with different rates



Rates of Displacement in Lebanon (August 9, 2006), Source: Samidoun Relief Campaign Daily Monitor

The Estimated rate of return provided by the HRC (Higher Relief Commission) is 81%, and UNICEF estimated the rate of return to be 6000 cars per hour heading to the most damaged areas in South Lebanon, also the SRC (Samidoun Relief Campaign) estimated the rate of return to be around 87%. Although the figures have some discrepancies between them, yet we surely conclude that a fast return has been established, and this relayed a high demand in shelter needs especially families whose homes have been completely destroyed or became unlivable due to high rate of damage.

Yet due to the extended family relations existing in Southern Lebanon communities, and other communal solidarity relations, a lot of families were hosted by their relatives or their neighbors, some were also hosted by families from neighboring villages, in addition some municipalities and CBOs managed to use already existing community spaces or their own offices to host families who found themselves without any shelter.


Such reaction by the returning community managed to create a safety net for the unsheltered population and allowed for higher coping abilities and mechanisms from the side of the returning population when dealing with the lack of shelter at that point.

B. Impact of the July War, Damage Assessment and Needs

The estimation of needs were conducted by several actors, the first main assessments conducted where the GoL damage assessment (Council of the South), Jihad el Bina' Assessment, and the SRC damage assessment on 70 villages, in addition there was the damage assessment conducted by the JRC and the EUSC, after that most of the actors working in shelter conducted their own shelter assessments, and most of these assessments were location specific depending on the area of intervention relevant to these actors.

The primary figures on shelter damage in South Lebanon based on GoL assessment estimates the totally affected units in South Lebanon to be 89,442 Housing Units, where 11.93% out of them are totally destroyed, 1.65% are partially destroyed and 82.31% are severely damaged and 4.11% are partially damaged.

The concentration of damage was mostly in Bint Jbeil, Tyr and Marejyoun Cazas, the rate of affected shelters from the total number of affected shelters is 28.15% in Tyr Caza, 27.38% in Bint Jbeil Caza, and 20.72% in Marjeyoun Caza. Yet these figures do not show the rate of damage on village level due to lack of baseline data on housing figures in the villages of south Lebanon.



Concentration of Damage by Total Affected Units in each Caza on the total of affected units in all South Lebanon Cazas; Source: GoL, UNRC Shelter Cluster Data, January 2008

C. Overview on the Response to Shelter Needs

The response to shelter needs started through the provision of temporarily accommodation for the most vulnerable groups, families whose homes are completely destroyed and families whose homes are partially damaged and unliveable.

The UNHCR with the Samidoun Relief Center distributed tents to these families in addition to some families who are hosting displaced families; in addition Jihad el Bina' started The IWAA' program which provides cash money for families whose house have been completely destroyed, the purpose of such payments are to provide these families that ability to rent apartments for one year and to be able to purchase basic furniture.

Yet the money given to the families was not used in the same way with all families, some families used it to rent apartments, others used it to pay back debts which were accumulated due to the war and others used to pay for schooling and university fees for their children. All in all the money delivered to the families had a significant impact on the recovery of the population.

Emergency repairs especially for partially damaged units started on the point of return either by the families who were able to conduct the

repairs on their own or through the interventions done by the different actors, from municipal bodies, NGOs and INGOs.

In addition, Cleaning repair tool kits (Community & Family) and shelter repair kits were distributed to several villages (62 villages) in South Lebanon (including Saida and Jezzine Caza) mainly by CRS/DPNA and CRS/Caritas, 4995 Family Cleaning Kits, 34 Community Cleaning Kits, 3007 Shelter repair kits. (Source: UNRC, Shelter Cluster Data January 2008)

Contents of the Kits

Content of Shelter Repair Kits	
Items	Description
Transparent plastic roll	120 cm width / 120 microns (9m ² =1kg)
Hammer	250gr, wood handle, remover of nails at top
Saw	capable of cutting iron and wood. Approx. 35cm long
Pick axe	with wood handle approx. 90cm long
Shovel	2kg with a wood handle
Regular tin cutter	
Measuring tape	5 meter
Carpenter square	metal - small size
Wire brush	wooden handle - 1.5 cm brush length
Rope	5mm x 50 m nylon
Multipurpose adhesive tape (duct tape)	48mm width - able to stick on plastic sheets
Timber Pine wood	section 1"x 2" (3 meters long each)
Nails 1" (2,5cm)	1/2 kg packing
Nails 2" (5 cm)	1/2 kg packing
Plastic bucket with handle	20 liters - heavy duty

Content of Community Cleaning Tool Kits	
Items	Description
Shovels	2 kg with wood handle
Pick axe	with a wooden handle
Wheelbarrow	50 kg load - welded
Gloves	heavy duty
Pry bar (or crow bar)	1.5 meters long
Rubber work boots	41-42
Rubber work boots	43-44
Plastic bucket with handle	20 liters - heavy duty
Bar cutter	capable of cutting 6mm steel bars

Content of Family Cleaning Tool Kits	
Items	Description
Cleaning powder	2 kg. bag (multi-purpose)
Disinfectant liquid	1 ltr. bottle
Household plastic bucket with handle	20 ltr volume

Broom	for household usage
Rubber gloves	for dishwashing usage

Source: UNRC, Shelter Cluster Data January 2008

D. Progress of the reconstruction process and cash Indemnities


The GoL started a pledging system where international donors pledge for the reconstruction of specific villages, in which they cover the needs for reconstruction and repairs and a system of indemnities was setup to re-compensate the destruction and to initiate the reconstruction process.

The villages that have been covered till now in the first payment installment are 261 out 331 villages, thus the first installment have a progress rate of only 78%, where the second installment is already due, this means that the progress in re-compensation or reconstruction can be assessed to be on a 50% rate for 78% of the villages, where it is still 0% for 22% of the villages.

In addition if we take the villages that have received payments by their respective Cazas we can clearly identify the gaps in terms of due payments

i. Caza of Bint Jbeil

Progress of payment deliveries in the Caza of Bint Jbeil




Source: UNRC Shelter Cluster Data, January 2008, GoL

The graph indicates that the progress in payment delivery to affected villages is still away from completion, having 3% of villages showing a progress rate of less than 10%, and where 39% of villages showing a progress rate between 10% and 50%, and 48% of villages showing a progress rate between 50% and 80%, and only 9% having received the complete allocated funds for reconstruction.

The general progress rate for the Bint Jbeil Caza is 53%, with a total of allocated funds of 189,927,814\$

ii. Caza of Nabatiyeh

Progress of Payment Deliveries in the Caza of Nabatiyeh




Source: UNRC Shelter Cluster Data, January 2008, GoL

The majority of the due payments are not yet delivered, having 17% of the villages with a progress rate less than 50%, where 46% of villages are showing progress rates between 50% and 80%, and 23% of villages having a progress rate above 80%, and with only 14% of the villages having received 100% plus of the allocated funds.

The general progress rate in the Caza of Nabatiyeh rounds up to 71%, with total allocated funds of 57,311,516\$

iii. Caza of Marjeyoun

Progress of Payment Deliveries in the Caza of Marjeyoun




Source: UNRC Shelter Cluster Data, January 2008, GoL

In the Caza of Marjeyoun, 51% of villages have a progress rate between 50% and 80%, and 6% of villages have a progress rate of 10% to 50%, where 33% of villages have a progress rate between 80% and 100% and 3% of villages have a progress of less than 10%, while only 8% of villages have a progress rate above 100%.

iv. Caza of Tyre

Progress of Payment Deliveries in the Caza of Tyre



Source: UNRC Shelter Cluster Data, January 2008, GoL

In the Caza of Tyr, about 3% of villages have a progress rate less than 10%, 30% of the villages have show progress rates between 10 to 50%, and where the majority of villages 51% have progress rates between 50% and 80%, and only 16% have shown progress between 80% and 100%.

The general progress rate in the caza of Tyr is 59% with total allocated funds of 192,338,628 USD

E. General Observations and Gaps

- i. Some villages in south Lebanon received between 5% to 80% more money than the allocated funds for reconstruction for these villages, while other villages have not received more than 5%. This shows great discrepancy in distribution of funds between different villages, and creates inequality in terms of recovery and rehabilitation.
- ii. The damage assessment criteria was not communicated clearly nor coordinated between the different assessing bodies, which left confusion in terms of identifying shelter needs and the accurate response, in addition the criteria for compensation as well for the assessment was not communicated clearly to the beneficiaries which left a lot of them unhappy and quite suspicious towards the intervention strategy.
- iii. Many contractors did not adhere to urban planning guidelines and procedures like general safety and accessibility standards, and with the absence of clear monitoring procedure, this may result in safety risks in many of the shelters in south Lebanon.
- iv. Lack of pricing regulation mechanisms, which allowed many suppliers to raise their prices in high rates, this rise in prices pushed a high proportion of families to either buy cheap and low quality materials which affected the safety and the quality of the reconstruction process, while others did not manage to complete the first phase of reconstruction, this issues reflected badly on building and dwelling standards in south Lebanon.
- v. The compensation process did not take into account the impact of displacement, with many families forced into debt the compensation in many cases were spent on paying back accumulated debt rather than using the amount for reconstruction; in addition several beneficiaries did not receive the whole amount of the first payment
- vi. Reconstruction efforts are not synchronized along a clear timeline. In result, the works in some villages were completed whereas works in other villages are still in their initial stages.
- vii. There is a low documentation of reconstruction projects, which renders the ability to assess the impact of shelter intervention quite low
- viii. Reconstruction works are hindered by strict bureaucratic measures when settling land disputes, replacing lost property documentation, and quickly expensing compensation payments.

- ix. Many in-kind donations were refused by local municipalities out of fear that they might lose the allocated official compensations.
- x. Big amounts of money were delivered as cash subsidies to beneficiaries while there was an absence of clear monitoring procedures which allow us to know the use of such money and the impact.

F. The Case of Jihad el Binaa':

The case of Jihad el Binaa':

This project was initiated in 1994 in order to assist residents of Southern villages in rebuilding or rehabilitating their housing units that were constantly damaged by Israeli hostilities. Back at the time, housing and shelter acquisition was not a problem in South Lebanon.

After the July-August 2006 war, Jihad el Binaa' decided to help IDPs return to their towns and villages as soon as possible, without resorting to prefabricated houses and tents. Accordingly, three projects were initiated:

1. *Iwaa* (shelter provision): this project compensated each completely destroyed house/unit for US \$ 12,000 that covers a full year rent expenses (US \$ 8,000) and damaged furniture (US \$ 4,000). *Iwaa* was extended for another year, however, just covering the full year rent expenses (US \$ 8,000).
2. *Tarmeem* (rehabilitation): Jihad el Binaa rehabilitated 90,000 housing units (28300 beneficiaries) in different Lebanese regions
3. *Ta'weed* (compensations): Jihad el Binaa agreed with the Government of Lebanon (GoL) on covering the extra needs of beneficiaries in case the GoL compensation (US \$ 12,000 for rehabilitation, and US \$ 20,000 for reconstruction).

Most owners of completely destroyed units received the first compensation payment. These beneficiaries were compensated for US \$ 40,000, the matter that allowed owners of small dwellings to expand their existing premises. In fact, Jihad el Binaa was lenient in applying zoning and planning regulations in accordance with the building permits.


Economic Sector

General and Specific Context

a- Introduction

It is very important to look at the economic structure and conditions of Lebanon as a whole and the changes that have occurred over the years to understand the context of the economy of South Lebanon and its recovery following the July 2006 war.

Since the early 1900's, the Lebanese economy witnessed a big drop in the agricultural and industrial sectors and a rise in the services sector. These changes are related to several factors, one main factor was the deterioration of the silk industry, due to the turn of international capital towards the Far East for silk production and also due to over-production. Another factor is the absence of national industrial and agricultural strategies which have rendered both of these sectors unable to compete in the regional and international markets. And one main important factor as well is the political and security instability that the country has been witnessing since 1950's.



Based on the size of engaged labour force in each economic sector

Sources: ILO, Labour Force Survey 1975, 1997; Living Conditions Survey CAS, 2004


Trends of uneven development of economic sectors are still one of the main characteristics of the economy in Lebanon. The above graph shows clearly such trends when comparing the economic sectors between 1975 (on the eve of the Lebanese civil war), 1997 (7 years after the Ta'ef agreement) and 2004.

Between 1975 and 1997, Lebanon had witnessed a 50% drop in the size of the labour force within the agricultural sector and an 8% drop in the industrial sector, compared with a 4% increase in the services sector.

While in 2004, compared to 1997, the agricultural sector dropped by 17% in terms of labour force size; the industrial sector rose by 4.27% and accounted for 23.7% of the labour force in 2004. In comparison, the construction industry accounts alone for 8.7%, leaving all other industrial activities with no more than 15% of the labour force. As for the services sector, (trade, transportation and telecommunications, monetary


intermediation and insurance) it rose by 17% to include 69.9% of the actual labor force.

From the listed trends and figures we can see that there is about 2% drop in the agricultural sector per year compared to 0.14% drop in the industrial sector per year and a yearly increase of 0.73% for the services sector.



Sources: ILO, Labour Force Survey 1975, 1997; Living Conditions Survey CAS, 2004

b- South Lebanon Specific Trends and Figures




Available statistics on South Lebanon are based on the level of the Mohafazat (governorate) and not the Caza (district). This means that the statistics for the area

(governorates of Nabatiyeh and South Lebanon) will not give us an accurate picture of the differences between the rural and urban economies of South Lebanon.

In addition, the lack of data on the level of Cazas limits us in understanding the actual baseline data of areas affected by the war that are mostly concentrated south of the Litany river, meaning in the Cazas of Tyre, Nabatiyeh, Marjeyoun and Bint Jbeil, being specific portions of each of the two governorates.

To deal with this discrepancy, we will be showing the baseline data by governorates which would give us a general overview of the situation but can not be considered as a specific description of the economy of South Lebanon (Nabatiyeh and South Lebanon Governorates).

Distribution of actual labour force according to economic sector and Governorates



Source: Living Conditions Survey, CAS, MoSA, UNDP, 2004

Generally, the picture is a little similar to national trends; a big services sector and smaller agricultural and industrial sectors. Yet we can see a larger agricultural sector (up to 20.66% of the labour force) in Nabatiyeh Governorate, which is mainly a rural area with the presence of big towns, such as Bint Jbeil, Khiam, Marjeyoun, and others.

The agricultural sector drops to lower percentages in the South Lebanon Governorate, which includes the Saida, Tyre, and Jezzine that are more urbanized, especially the City of Saida and its surroundings. Yet, the concentration of industry is similar in both governorates, mostly concentrated in the construction sector, due to the progressive rate of urbanization in both Governorates.

C- Pre-War conditions of the economy in South Lebanon


The economy of South Lebanon has been witnessing several problems over the years due to various reasons:

- **Political and security instability:** the general insecurity in the Middle East as well as the political and security instability in Lebanon, in addition to the recurrent wars that have occurred in South Lebanon since the early 50's of the last century. All of these factors managed to drive out large numbers of

the population and pushed away possible investments and initiatives to develop the economy of the region.

- **General unevenness in economic development:** One of the long standing problems in the Lebanese economy is the unevenness in development, where the economy is centralized in Beirut and some other cities in Lebanon, and whereas rural areas are considered the most impoverished, with lack of many basic services, and the absence of an economic infrastructure to support the development of the rural economy.

We can see clearly such unevenness through the following map, which has been produced by the Ministry of Social Affairs, UNDP and the Central Administration of Statistics in 1996. The map is based on income related indicators.




Source: <http://www.undp.org.lb/programme/pro-poor/poverty/povertyinlebanon/molc/main.html>

The map shows the distribution of income in Lebanon with the red districts having the lowest income levels and the yellow districts having the highest income indicators

- **National economic strategies are mainly focused on the services sector:** National policies have traditionally focused on services, with investments mainly concentrated in real estate and the services, trade, and finance sectors. Both the industrial and the agricultural sectors show counter-development trends. In addition, economic projects related to irrigation have been regressing over the years, and leaving the agricultural sector relying on arid culture (Olives, Tobacco, etc...).
- One of Lebanon main characteristics is the sharp urbanization that has driven large sections of the population out of the rural regions towards the cities, looking for economic and social stability. One of the main living proofs of the trend is the Beirut Southern Suburbs, home for hundreds of thousands of

Lebanese citizens who migrated from the villages of the South and Bekaa. Yet, the inability of the central economy to host such large populations left them residents of what can be named as urban slums, where a large proportion of the population is concentrated in the informal sector.

Growth rate of urban population in Lebanon compared to the growth of rural population in Lebanon (between 1975 and 2000)



Source: E/ESCWA/HS/1999/7, Human Settlements Data Sheets, New York, 1999

Demographic importance of urban centres in Lebanon


Governorate / Caza/ Capital	Ratio of urban population in capital cities to caza and governorate		
	Caza/ Governorate	Capital/ Caza	Capital/ Governorate
Mount-Lebanon / Baabda / Baabda	21	3	1
North / Tripoli / Tripoli	32	80	26
South / Sidon / Sidon	46	41	19
Nabatieh / Nabatieh/ Nabatieh	36	17	6
Bekaa / Zahleh / Zahleh	29	40	12
Beirut / Beirut / Beirut	100	100	100

Source: Ministry of Interior and Municipal Affairs, 1998

The urbanization trends shown in the above graph and table are a clear indicator of internal migration to the cities, this migration led to the lack of labour force in the regions, and more specifically skilled labour force. This was also confirmed by the participants of the focus group conducted by Lebanon Support on the economic situation of South Lebanon on 23/2/2008.


D- Labour Force Characteristics in South Lebanon

Distribution of the workforce in South Lebanon (including the Cazas of Saida and Jezzine) according to profession



Source: Living Conditions Survey, 2004 CAS, UNDP, MoSA

Distribution of the actual labour force according to industry and Governorates



Source: Living Conditions Survey, CAS, MoSA, UNDP, 2004

The graphs above show that the main sectors of employment in South Lebanon are: Services, Trade, Agriculture, and Construction. In addition, ILO indicates that employment in South Lebanon relies on small and medium-sized enterprises that are central in providing livelihoods and sustainable employment for large sections of society.

“According to the CAS [Central Administration for Statistics], more than [sic] 80% of companies in Lebanon and specifically in Nabatieh, Bekaa and the South are micro enterprises providing more than 80% of job opportunities. Some of the main impediments to rapid growth and improvement of small enterprises in conflict-affected countries have always been the absence of a conducive legal and regulatory framework geared towards entrepreneurship development, the lack of required business start-up capital, the deficiency in the provision of basic business management skills, the absence of an effective service infrastructure. Lebanon is no exception and these deficiencies, which pre-dated the last war, remain a challenge to overcome in the aftermath of the massive destruction and losses incurred in the conflict.”
 (An ILO Post Conflict Decent Work Programme for Lebanon, September 2006).

To understand the impact of the July war on the economy of south Lebanon we have to look into the direct physical damage it created, as well as the loss in livelihoods and the loss of income for a large numbers of the population during the war and months after. The direct physical damage and indirect costs of the war in general was assessed by the CDR to be around 9.823 billion USD

E- General impact of the July war on South Lebanon

The districts of South Lebanon that were attacked by Israel in July and August 2006 had, according to UNDP/MoSA/CAS Living Conditions Survey in 1996 and 2004, recorded some of the highest rates of poverty in the country even before the war. The loss of assets, housing, crops, and loss of life rendered the living conditions of the most vulnerable (women headed household, elderly, orphans, and disabled) even worse than it was. The ILO estimates that about “15% of those who were injured during the war will be permanently disabled, and the number of women headed households in the war-affected areas is on the rise”¹.

Although there has been no record of the precise impact of the war on the labor force, we can deduce, from looking at the scale of the physical destruction and damage, that many workers have either lost their jobs or have been laid off due to the destruction/damage of their respective workplace.

During the war, hundreds of thousands were internally displaced, leaving their jobs and businesses behind. Huge numbers of workers were unable to work. According to the ILO, “[many] of the returnees following the cessation of hostilities are likely to have re-engaged in some form of income-generating economic activity but, on the other hand, thousands of employees have been dismissed from their jobs largely due to damages incurred to factories, enterprises and land. In addition, many micro and small entrepreneurs suffered from the conflict, as businesses and commercial enterprises were either physically damaged or have become dysfunctional due to the loss of capital and assets. Thousands of small and medium enterprises, which form the backbone of the Lebanese economy, were completely destroyed, partially damaged or sustained major operational losses.” (An ILO Post Conflict Decent Work Programme for Lebanon, September 2006)

Simultaneously, farmers and agricultural workers lost their sources of income due to damages to land and livestock. Around 68 square kilometres of agricultural land have been damaged, aggravating the livelihood conditions of thousands of families in South Lebanon. Also, the presence of UXOs, Cluster Bombs, and other unexploded ordnance made a large portion of agricultural lands inaccessible, also pushing many farmers to miss the time for harvest particularly in the tobacco, olive, and citrus plantations. They were also unable to market their products due to road closures, unavailability of fuel, and to the security situation. Additionally, the ILO estimates that around 5000 fishermen with their families have lost their livelihoods during the war and for several months after the cease fire.

F- Main information gaps related to the economic impact of the war:

- 1) Absence or unavailability of baseline data on income (or Labour Force Survey) especially for the labour force operating within small and medium enterprises, one of the main backbones of South Lebanon’s economy.

¹ Source: An ILO Post Conflict Decent Work Programme for Lebanon, September 2006

- 2) Lack of detailed assessments on the impact of displacement on the livelihoods of the affected population (permanent migration and emigration, accumulation of debts, impact on the availability of human capital in South Lebanon).
- 3) Lack of a market fluctuations monitor, which is essential in determining the impact of the war on the market in addition to determining if reconstruction and rehabilitation aids are consistent with market prices and the post-war economy of south Lebanon.
- 4) Lack of information on the pre-war and post-war purchasing power and trends of the affected population which enables us to see more clearly the impact of the war on their coping mechanisms.

These information gaps do not allow us to assess comprehensively the impact of the war on livelihoods and on the economy. Nevertheless, we are able to understand, in a general manner, the sectors that suffered from the war and which activities might push further the economic rehabilitation process within South Lebanon.

II- Specific Economic Sectors Analysis

The study will look closely at three main sectors: Services and Trade, Agriculture, and Construction, which are the three main sectors in terms of employment in South Lebanon, and the main sectors where information is available.

A- Services and Trade Sector

The Higher Relief Council (HRC) estimates that about 900 medium sized enterprises (including factories, markets, farms, etc...) and 2,800 small enterprises have suffered extensive damage. Although these figures cover the whole of Lebanon, they can give us a good idea about the amount of damage that South Lebanon has suffered from the war. These figures do not also include the loss in assets and goods during the war.


The services and trade sector was also affected from the absence and slowing down of social activity in southern villages and towns in the first few months after the war. Moreover, loss of livelihoods and the drop in purchasing power has largely affected the wellbeing of the services and trade sector in South Lebanon.

Although it is highly noticeable that between September and November 2006, portions of the services and trade sectors and especially small businesses located in villages had been able to partially recover and to deliver for the needs of the returning population, these businesses were essential in also allowing many sections of the returning population to recover and move out from basic needs to needs related to recovery.

For example, an assessment conducted by Samidoun in October 2006 indicates that needs related to immediate and basic survival were withering away to be replaced by needs related to living and livelihood conditions, and more specifically to shelter and wintering needs such as heating systems. Such changes in needs were related to a degree of recovery of local markets and economies within the southern villages. This was also mentioned as the main source for food and water for most of the families who were interviewed by the Samidoun Secondary Assessment in October 2006.


Such a fast recovery of the trade and services sector is mainly due to the fast return of the population that drove the need for local markets high. In addition, the money dispatched by Jihad Al Binaa' to the returnees, and especially to the families who lost their homes, helped to boost the purchasing power of the affected population and allowed a fast transition from basic needs to secondary needs.

Community Needs Assessment



Source: SAMIDOUN Secondary Needs Assessment, October 2006

Individual Needs Assessment



Source: SAMIDOUN Secondary Needs Assessment, October 2006

The above mentioned Samidoun Assessment was conducted on 50 villages in South Lebanon assessing the needs of the affected population on Individual and community level, one of the main important results of the assessment was the absence of needs related to Food and basic human sustenance, to be replaced by needs related to livelihoods, and shelter, more specifically wintering needs.

Such fast recovery in basic human sustenance is not an indication that full recovery in the services and trade sectors has been attained, since many of these businesses rely in their recovery on the reconstruction process that has not been accomplished yet.

Furthermore, due to the destruction and slow reconstruction process in the affected regions, trades and services related to tourism and seasonal residence in South Lebanon were also damaged, leading to a drop in income and economic activity which are essential for these sectors especially in the summer, where cohorts of families originally from south Lebanon go back to their villages come back from Beirut or abroad to spend their yearly vacations in their respective villages. There hasn't been any real assessment on the impact of the war and destruction on such mobility to be able to address the impact on such economic activity, but many news and NGO reports speculate that such trends have dropped after the July war.

b- Recovery Activities in income generation

The amount of work and programmes initiated to support the recovery of services and trade in South Lebanon is not sufficiently documented, but it is important to mention that support given to the rehabilitation of the sector was mainly focused in the reconstruction process. Additionally it included projects aiming at providing short and long-term loans for small and medium businesses to help them restart their work and cover their lost assets. This kind of activities were mainly conducted by local and international NGOs, UN agencies, in addition to banks and private donors.

There have also been programmes providing cash for work in addition to programmes providing compensation money for lost assets conducted by many types of actors.

Mapping of Livelihood Activities in South Lebanon

The main actors in the livelihood sector are: UNDP, ILO, Premier Urgence, Jihad el Binaa, NRC, DRC, Italian Cooperation, CRTDA, and others.

You can check the UNRC map on livelihood activities in South Lebanon that gives a clear overview of where are livelihood activities taking place and which actors are involved [ANNEX MAP_LIV_SL].

Programmes and projects differ in approach and activities, CRTDA worked on supporting 117 women in south Lebanon to start their own business, targeting women headed households, divorced, and widowed women.

ILO worked on vocational training for workers, more specifically training for construction workers, and worked on establishing an employment service centre which is a national project with the ministry of Labour

Premiere Urgence, provided cash for work for approximately 500 beneficiaries in 60 villages, and provided three batches of toolkits, each batch targets around 70 beneficiaries.

UCODEP worked on providing alternatives for tobacco plantations, opened a food production facility in Aitaroun, and worked on linking farmers with the Souk El Tayeb to be able to sell their products.

DRC implemented cash for work projects in 12 municipalities, worked on building supporting roads for safety, opened agricultural roads, and worked on irrigation systems. The DRC provided construction vocational trainings and distributed winterization kits.

Italian Cooperation, through its partners, managed to conduct several livelihood projects in South Lebanon, including trainings; re-compensation of lost business and agricultural assets; providing machinery to enhance local production; and supported micro projects

Jihad el Binaa (JBDA) worked on 37 projects with CDR targeting various fields such as fisheries, mushroom plantations, bananas, olive presses, and livestock; in addition JBDA provided management and financial trainings.

Samidoun Relief Center (SRC) in collaboration with Handicap International and SDC provided 1,000 wintering kits for the most vulnerable families in South Lebanon.

SDC provided cash donations to 7 villages, implemented a socio-economic programme to farmers in Zibqine, provided grants to the poorest families categorized as farmers and small business owners, targeting 1,600 families in 7 villages.

ECHO: Economic Recovery Component: €6 million

“This component of the programme is based on the determining outcomes of the already existing «Economic and Social Fund for Development» programme (ESFD – financed by the European Union). This programme, which is being implemented since 2002, allowed the development/start-up of more than 1,650 enterprises in the services (36%), trade (31%), industry (22%) and agriculture (11%) sectors, as well as the creation of approximately 1,400 jobs.

The main characteristic of this programme lies in its target: small entrepreneurs deemed un-bankable so far and now benefiting from a personalised technical assistance which improved their access to bank facilities granted by one of the three partner banks, Société Générale de Banque Liban (SGBL), Banque Libanaise pour le Commerce (BLC) and Crédit Libanais.

However, the July-August 2006 conflict had direct repercussions on the programme's beneficiaries whereby 7% of the enterprises were partially or totally destroyed and 22% suffered economic damage, according to an ESFD assessment.

The new funding allocated within the scope of the «Support to Economic Recovery and Reconstruction» programme aims at enabling entrepreneurs in destructed areas to access a new bank loan and allowing, in the long run, the creation of more than 300 jobs.

On the other hand, the project considers helping seven municipalities or clusters of municipalities (1- Aytaroun ; 2- Cluster of: Tireh, Rcheif and Sorbine ; 3- Cluster of: Toulina and Aadshit el Ksair ; 4- Aadshit ; 5- Cluster of: El Mary, Helta and El Majiddieh; 6- Aynata ; 7- Cluster of: Al Boustan, Al Zaloutiyeh, Jibbeen, Marwaheen, Oum el Tout, El Dhayra) which were selected by the ESFD for the implementation of local development plans. Given the partial destruction of their infrastructure (buildings, equipment, facilities) during the conflict, the economic recovery component is designed to enable the rehabilitation of the infrastructure considered as having priority by the local authorities.

30,000 inhabitants from the targeted towns and villages are expected to benefit from these rehabilitation measures.

The «Support to Economic Recovery and Reconstruction» programme will be managed by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). The CDR will implement the Reconstruction component whereas the ESFD will implement the Economic Recovery component.”

(Extract from: **The European Union and Lebanon: Together to Realise your Projects**, Press File)

These projects constitute a general outlook on the type of work conducted but cannot serve as an indicator of progress of the economic recovery and rehabilitation process as needs were mostly assessed on project basis and not as an overall assessment. Thus, the impact of these activities and the gap in terms of needs related to economic rehabilitation is not recorded.

Several participants in the focus groups conducted by Lebanon Support indicated that although many activities were conducted to push ahead the economic rehabilitation of the affected population of South Lebanon, the economic situation of the population is still unstable. Activities are mainly based on surgical interventions that deliver their impact on individual cases. They are far from attaining an overall rehabilitation of the economic situation of region.

Such a gap is related to the lack of a national strategy for economic recovery and rehabilitation and the lack of any developmental strategies for the south. This, on one hand, establishes a link between the recovery and the development phase and, on the other, establishes clear indicators and guidelines for the recovery phase, thus enabling to study impact and progress of activities.

In addition, the rehabilitation of the economic conditions of the South Lebanon residents is highly linked to the reconstruction process, as many residents are still waiting for their re-compensations so they can be able to finalize rebuilding their businesses.

c- Agriculture in South Lebanon

The Agricultural sector in South Lebanon suffers from several problems that pre-date the 2006 war.

First, most of the agricultural land in the South is not irrigated and farmers depend mainly on rain water to grow their crops; there are some exceptions in parts of the Cazas of Marjeyoun, Beint Jbeil and Hasbaya. This problem puts a lot of restriction on the variety of crops grown in the South.

Second, the gradual migration of significant numbers of Southern residents to Beirut and its suburbs on one hand, and abroad on the other, made the residents focus on other economic activities (e.g. only 32% of registered residents of Bint Jbeil Caza reside there).

Third, agricultural produce is distributed and consumed locally. Very few crops—namely olives, tobacco, and citrus fruits—are exported to other Lebanese regions and destinations abroad. These crops suffer from fierce competition from industrialized crops grown in other Lebanese areas such as Bekaa and North Lebanon, as well as from imported goods from other countries.

Fourth, agriculture in South Lebanon is characterized by an individualistic scope of work and lack of industrialization and technological development that can help and support agricultural produce. In addition, farmers are unable to export their produce properly because of their limited financial resources and the unavailability of agro-food industry that can absorb the surplus of agricultural produce. In result, agricultural activities lost their competitive edge and became meager means of providing the basic needs households depending on this sector. (Lebanon-Support, Focus groups conducted on 23/2/2008)

There are three major agricultural crops in the South: citrus fruits, tobacco, and olives:

- a) Citrus fruits: This crop is produced in coastal areas. Citrus gardens/groves are well-irrigated, and the produce is close to exportation standards. It is believed that citrus agriculture is among the leading agricultural sectors and has relatively less problems than other crops. However, a significant part of the land that

produces citrus fruits is being converted to banana plantations. One of the main reasons of this crop production conversion is the severe competition that faces citrus fruits produced in the south.

- b) Tobacco: It is one of the few remaining crops that are subsidized by the GoL. In fact, participants in the focus groups organized by Lebanon Support agreed that it is difficult for tobacco farmers in the South to convert to the production of other crops because tobacco is considered to be a secure sector due to the several factors. First, tobacco production provides its growers with an income of L.P. 4,200,000 per annum (equivalent to the minimum wage rate per annum). Farmers sell their produce to the Regie, which owns the monopoly of tobacco manufacturing and export in Lebanon. Accordingly, tobacco growers acquire licenses allowing them to plant their crops. Some farmers tend to purchase more than one permit (since each farmer is allowed to have only one license) in order to increase their shares and revenues; or through renting the extra permits to other farmers. Ideally, tobacco agriculture depends on rainwater since little irrigation is needed to obtain a higher quality tobacco. In fact, farmers are irrigating their crops to get more produce. Tobacco growing and harvest/collection cause serious health problems to the farmer. Research has shown that constant direct contact with the plant causes high nicotine levels in the blood. In addition, tobacco agriculture has a negative psychosocial effect on children who constitute a part of the labor involved in its production. Tobacco growers in the South depend on the help of their children to reduce the extra fees of employing workers. Research conducted on 350 children in the regions of Bint Jbeil and Marjeyoun has shown that children who work in tobacco agriculture have a bad school performance when compared to their classmates, since their work reduces their studying hours and makes them less interested in schools. Participants in the focus group stated that the government was considering retaining its subsidy from the tobacco sector. However, no serious action has been taken in this regard since the sector is considered “a source of economic and social security for a significant number of farmers.” Active organizations and political parties have also worked against retaining subsidy from this sector due to its social importance. However, it is believed that the marginalization of the farmers working in this sector will maintain.
- c) Olive trees: Olive agriculture is the prominent source of income in the Cazas of Hasbaya and Marjeyoun as well as other Cazas where olives are used to produce oil. However, the consumption of the produce olive/olive oil barely exceeds Southern regions. The relatively high cost of labor makes the oil uncompetitive with the olive oil produced in North Lebanon (which is industrialized). Although modern olive pressing machines are being used, this agro-food industry remains lacking in several aspects that could guarantee its competitiveness in regional and international markets, such as proper packaging, meeting nutritional standards of international markets, use of proper chemical fertilizers, in addition to others. The irrigation of olive groves in the South depends mainly on rainwater. Accordingly, the produced quantities alternate each year depending on quantity of water it receives during the rain season. At another level, the absence of equipped laboratories for oil-quality control made farmers and traders sell low-quality olive oil, mixed sometimes with other oils such as corn oil.


d- Impact of the July War on Agriculture

According to an initial assessment made by FAO after the war, damage and losses to the agricultural sector amounted to some US\$ 280 million.

Half of the working population in South Lebanon relies wholly on agriculture for a living, with the sector providing nearly 70 percent of total household incomes. Some 50,000 families have been financially damaged by the war.


Municipal and independent information sources shows that, in 100 villages in South Lebanon, lost assets in olive trees counts to around 64,562 trees; in citrus and banana it counts to 19,250 trees; as for fruits, it counts to 35,832 trees; in addition to a various range of trees where. The total is 105,967 trees. In addition, about 27,350 kilograms of Tobacco produce was destroyed by the war.

Damaged and destroyed trees in South Lebanon (100 Villages)



Source: Lebanon Support Field Survey, Municipalities, Different Sources and Information Agents

Damage to agricultural land for 100 villages in South Lebanon



Source: Lebanon Support Field Survey, Municipalities, Different Sources and Information Agents

In terms of damage to farmland, the higher damage were inflicted on citrus and banana farm land with 50,192 square meters, Olive-trees farmland comes second with 5,208 square meters, followed by grains, tobacco, then various trees, vegetables and fruits.

As for livestock, around 922,541 domestic birds were killed, 3,030 beehives were destroyed, and 2,321 cattle were killed.

The scale of damages and the loss of agricultural assets rendered many families in south Lebanon, who rely on agriculture as their main source of income, quite vulnerable and risking to be driven into worse livelihood conditions and poverty.

e- Interventions and progress

Relief Web Estimates the sum of interventions related to agriculture between 2006 and 2007 in Lebanon as a whole to be 10,068,544 USD.

In September 2007, FAO launched a 3.3 USD million to help smallholders in South Lebanon resume farming after interruption caused by last the July war and unexploded ordnance.

In 2007, CARITAS conducted a 77,067 USD Programme for the rehabilitation of irrigation systems and agriculture in South Lebanon.

Many other interventions were also conducted in the rehabilitation of agriculture in south Lebanon. The major ones were mentioned in the paragraph above (**Recovery Activities in income generation**).

Many of the interventions conducted in the recovery of the agricultural sector are undocumented and thus data available on the progress of recovery remains insufficient to draw a general picture.

Lebanon Support conducted a field survey on 13 villages to try to assess some of the progress of agricultural recovery works in the form of case studies.

Agriculture, village of Froun:

Size of Agricultural Lands: 3 square kilometres

Direct Damages to Land: 0%

Type of Crops: Tobacco and Olives

Difficulty in using agricultural lands due to Cluster Bombs and UXOs: 3%

UXO and Cluster Bombs Clearance: 97%

The Municipality mentions that irrigation channels and basic equipment for agriculture exist in the village. The main needs identified are more concentrated on fertilizers and agricultural supplies and equipment for cultivation.

Livestock, village of Froun:

Number of Cattle: 810

% of Damage: 60%

Number of Domestic Birds: 5400

% of Damage: 60%

Recovery Work coverage in relation to the rehabilitation of Livestock: No remuneration

Identified Needs: Financial remunerations

Agriculture, village of Srifa:

Size of Agricultural Lands: 600 Hectares

Direct Damages to Land: 80%

Type of Crops: Tobacco and Olives

Difficulty in using agricultural lands due to Cluster Bombs and UXOs: 0%

UXO and Cluster Bombs Clearance: 100%

The Municipality mentions that irrigation channels do not exist in the village while basic equipment for agriculture does. The main needs identified are concentrated on fertilizers, agricultural supplies, rehabilitation of land, and the provision of equipment for cultivation

Livestock:

Number of Cattle: 1620

% of Damage: 60%

Recovery Work coverage in relation to the rehabilitation of Livestock: 50% remuneration done by a local NGO, which name was not mentioned in the answers of the survey

Identified Needs: Financial remunerations from the state

Agriculture, village of Yater:

Size of Agricultural Lands: 19 square kilometres

Direct Damages to Land: No Data Available

Type of Crops: Tobacco, Olives and Fruits

Difficulty in using agricultural lands due to Cluster Bombs and UXOs: 75%

UXO and Cluster Bombs Clearance: 60%

The Municipality mentions that no irrigation plans exist in the village, while basic equipment for agriculture does. The main needs identified are more concentrated on financial remunerations.

Livestock:

Number of Cattle: 600

% of Damage: 80%



Number of Domestic Birds: 500



% of Damage: 80%


Recovery Work coverage in relation to the rehabilitation of Livestock: No remuneration

Identified Needs: Financial remunerations in addition to Livestock culture programmes

f- Identified Needs in agriculture [Source: InterSOS Assessment, 2007]







The main needs identified and which are still relevant to date (relevancy proved based on interviews with municipalities in South Lebanon) are related to lack of irrigation systems, loss of crops and cattle and the presence of UXO and unexploded ordinance within numerous sections of agricultural lands within South Lebanon. Although some of these problems predate the July war such as the irrigation, yet it seems one of the main components to ensure sustainable livelihoods and income sources for the affected population, it is as voiced by some of the participants in the Lebanon Support Focus groups as Contingency measure to help ensure the livelihoods of the affected population facing the deterioration of livelihoods after the July war.

As in terms of long term development in the sector of agriculture in south Lebanon, irrigation is considered as a top priority (Lebanon Support Focus Groups conducted on) since first it provides more choices in terms of plantations for southern Lebanese peasants and families.


Irrigation and the Tobacco Agriculture

The tobacco agriculture in Southern Lebanon is considered as a social and economic safety net as it provides families in South Lebanon with a steady income, but at the same time for the majority of families, it only provides basic sustenance needs which drives the whole family to work at an early age and contributes to the stagnation of social mobility within the southern Lebanon families (Lebanon Support focus groups conducted on).

The solution to such problem is by the opinion of most participants is through irrigation projects as they provide the agrarian infrastructure for families to shift from arid culture such as the tobacco towards other types of plantation which are more economically productive, but at the same time to keep the tobacco subsidies intact until families have secured a better alternative.

g- The Construction Industry

The construction industry constitutes a good percentage of the industrial sector, 45.6% of the Industrial sector in South Lebanon Governorate, and 58.34% of the industrial sector in Nabatiyeh Governorate, amounting to 50% in South Lebanon in general (both governorates).



Source: Living Conditions Survey, CAS, MoSA, UNDP, 2004

The construction sector is higher in rural contexts rather than the urbanized context, showing a sharp decrease in Lebanon's rural population and a transformation of many of the rural villages into urban towns.

The high economic activity in terms of construction is mainly related to two important factors:

- **Urbanization:** Lebanon is categorized as one of most urbanized countries in the region (excluding the Gulf countries). The urbanization rate is estimated to be 90% with an estimated average growth of urban population of 2.2 between 2000 and 2006 (UNICEF), combined with systematic negative growth of rural population, -3.98 per 5 years between 1975 and 2000 (Source: E/ESCWA/HS/1999/7, Human Settlements Data Sheets, New York, 1999). The drive towards urbanization and the general negative growth of rural activities such as agriculture has driven many of the south Lebanon population to start using their lands for other purposes. Construction is the gateway for other sectors of the economy especially in terms of services, as well as it is the entry point for better housing conditions.
- **Internal displacement and return:** Due to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, many families were displaced and had migrated to the Beirut

Southern Suburbs. After the withdrawal of Israeli troops in 2000, many families sought to return back to their respective villages. But this return cannot anymore be full, so they began to build houses for them and their families, which they would visit during summer vacations. Moreover, due to the several conflicts and wars that the south has witnessed throughout the years, construction and re-construction has been one of the persistent trends within the area.

h- Impact of the July War and recovery of the construction sector in South Lebanon

The high scale of destruction let out by the July 2006 Israeli attacks, implied a growing need for construction services, which would generate a growing participation of the labour force in the construction sector.

According to the CDR, the cost of physical damage is estimated to be around 2,070 US \$ Million. This means that the above-mentioned amount of money would be directed to the construction sector. This resulted in reviving the sector as well as in reviving sectors which are indispensable to the re-construction process.

There has not been any study or assessment to measure the economic value of the construction sector in the reconstruction and recovery phase, nor there was any study to assess the size of the labour force it contains. In addition, many participants in the focus groups conducted by Lebanon Support estimate that there will be a considerable drop in employment in the construction sector after the construction phase is over. They suspect that many construction workers will find themselves jobless and with no alternatives, as the economic recovery plans and strategies have not yet managed to establish a developmental outlook to be able to ensure sustainability in employment and in income generation.

i- The Economic Significance of the reconstruction in the recovery process of South Lebanon

All participants in the Lebanon Support Focus Groups (23/2/2008) agreed that the reconstruction is an important drive in revitalizing the economy of South Lebanon as it engages large numbers of the Labour force, in addition it stimulates different sectors of the economy which are needed in reconstruction such as sections of the industrial sector (brick production, metal works, etc...) in addition, reconstruction helps revitalize the trade sector, especially in trades related to construction materials. Another impact of reconstruction is that it opens the door for the development or possible growth of small entrepreneurs to develop their businesses.

But also there are fears that this drive towards the reconstruction sector would reach certain stagnation once the reconstruction is complete, and large sections of the labour force who got engaged in it might find themselves without jobs especially that there isn't any economic planning to move out the region from the recovery phase to the development phase.


j- The possible real estate bubble on National level and its possible impacts on South Lebanon

Rasha Abou Zaki wrote in Al-Akhbar on the 22nd of July 2008: “According to financial sources, housing loans and mortgages are on the rise, it rose by 20.7% between 2006 and 2007, and between May 2007 and May 2008, it rose by 28.64%. Property prices in Beirut rose quite noticeably, between January 2008 and July 2008, estimates out the rise to be about 40%, where the average meter square price have reached about 1,500 USD. An official from Ramco Real Estate firm expects prices to keep rising and to reach 60% by the end of 2008. this price increase is pushing land-owners to reclaim their lands from the tenants and to sell them, benefiting from the price increase; All of that while the purchasing power of the majority of the population is still falling, which obviously signals a widening gap between housing prices and people's purchasing power, a strong indicator that the country might reach a real estate bubble”

Although the speculations of many news agencies that this bubble would be mainly centralized in high-value real estate located mainly in the central districts of Beirut city, yet we might find a similar impact to that of 1990's Lebanon on the peripheries of the Lebanese economy such as South Lebanon.


Large sums of the oil money coming from the Gulf countries, as well as money coming from Lebanese businessmen living in Diaspora are being invested in real estate all over the country. And South Lebanon is no alien to such trends, since many municipal sources in South Lebanon villages have recorded a rise in real-estate dealings, and by looking into the Central Administration for Statistics Real Estate transaction Monitor, we can see quite clearly such increase in real estate dealings in the war affected areas (Southern Suburbs of Beirut in Mount Lebanon, South Lebanon Governorate and the Nabatiyeh Governorate)

Real Estate Transaction between 2006 and 2007 in the selected governorates



Source: Central Administration of Statistics (Statistical Yearbook 2006, Statistical Monthly Bulletin 2007) [www.cas.gov.lb]

Difference between total real estate transactions between 2006 and 2007 in selected governorates



Source: Central Administration of Statistics (Statistical Yearbook 2006, Statistical Monthly Bulletin 2007) [www.cas.gov.lb]

We can see quite clearly the rise of real estate transactions in all war-affected areas to be on the rise, Nabatiyeh Governorate ranking first, then South Lebanon Governorate, Mount Lebanon (which includes the Southern Suburbs of Beirut) and Bekaa. Where Beirut is witnessing a drop in real estate transactions between 2006 and 2007, but many real estate dealerships are seeing a rise in transactions happening since the beginning of 2008 in Beirut.

Such rise in transactions can be considered in 2007 as a direct impact of the July war and symptom of the reconstruction process, but also it can be seen as part of a national trend towards real estate investment, and can be pushed further when political stability is achieved on the level of the State.

Such unplanned drive towards real estate investments might encourage middle income businessmen towards investing in real estate, as a way towards acquiring wealth and better income levels, but at the same time, if there are no precautions taken on the level of the national economy, the construction sector might reach a level of stagnation, where we would have more houses than there is need for, or where property value might exceed the purchasing power of the majority of Lebanese families, which will lead to a sharp drop in property values, and in stagnation of the sales movement in real estate and housing, which would have a heavier impact on newly engaged investors and on small and medium investors, and large investors would be able to easily overcome such events.

The general trend of uneven development within the different economic sectors, is becoming more and more a risky and shaken grounds for the development of the economy of South Lebanon, as capital is being invested without taking into consideration the consequences, and might demoralize or push for the loss of trust of local and international investments in South Lebanon.

EDUCATION SECTOR

VII- Education Sector

A. Introduction & Pre-War Context


South Lebanon (Nabatiyeh & South Lebanon Governorate) has 523 schools, where 58.5% of them (306) are public official schools and 41.5 (217) are private schools, and of the 306 public schools, 81% (248) are primary schools and 19% (58) are secondary schools [source: Ministry of Education & Higher Education (<http://www.higher-edu.gov.lb>); SchoolNet (<http://www.schoolnet.edu.lb>)]. School types in South Lebanon have three main types:

- Public Schools: Schools owned and operated by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education of the Government of Lebanon
- Semi-Public Schools: Schools which are privately operated and partially supported by the Government of Lebanon through the Ministry of Education and Higher Education
- Private Schools (Religious & Secular): Schools which are owned privately either by persons or institutions, operated privately under the regulatory process of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education

In terms of educational infrastructure, the south enjoy a high number of school buildings mainly concentrated in primary educational facilities, but these facilities were built based on a purely geographic distribution without giving any consideration to demographic characteristics nor to the actual professional and technical human resources capacity available in the education sector. Such planning led to have some schools to be overcrowded, having more than 30+ students per classroom where other schools have less than 5 students per classroom (*Lebanon Support Focus Group on Education conducted on 24/2/2008*)

Yet the above-mentioned problem is not apparent in official statistics since information is only available on the level of the governorate, which hides these gaps since they exist on the village level.


Ratio of number of students per teacher in the Southern Lebanon Governorates (South Lebanon & Nabatiyeh) compared to national ratios



Source: Central Administration of Statistics (Statistical Yearbook 2006)


And another gap between South Lebanon's Educational trends and the national trends is that of Intermediate, Secondary and University education, while on the elementary level, the gap is positive.

Population size per education level, in both Nabatiyeh and South Lebanon Governorates compared to the National level




Source: Central Administration for Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 2006

Educational Gap between South Lebanon Governorate and the National level



Source: Central Administration for Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 2006

Educational Gap between Nabatieh Governorate and the National level



Source: Central Administration for Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 2006

The most important issue to notice from the up-mentioned graphs is that of the illiteracy rate in South Lebanon is considerably higher than the

national trends, In the South Lebanon Governorate the illiteracy rate is 8.87%, being 88.73% higher than the national rate, while in Nabatiyeh Governorate, the illiteracy rate is much higher reaching an 11.5% of the resident population, being 145.18% higher than the national rate.

When tackling the trends of School levels (pre-school, elementary, intermediate, and secondary and university level) we notice that the negative gap starts in its lowest rates at the intermediate level (-5.76% lower than the national rate in South Lebanon Governorate, and -21.24% in Nabatiyeh Governorate) which is a credible indicator on the lack of skilled labor in South Lebanon, since the positive gaps are based in the pre-school level (209.81% more than national level in South Lebanon Governorate and 285.97% in Nabatiyeh Governorate) and elementary level (18.31% more than national rate in South Lebanon Governorate and 18.15% in Nabatiyeh Governorate).

These trends can be seen as a result of the agrarian nature of the economy in South Lebanon from one side, and to the lack of economic opportunities which drives potential skilled labor outside of South Lebanon moving towards Beirut and other Lebanese cities looking for better education and better work opportunities. These conditions are aggravated by child labor which is spread in South Lebanon especially in the tobacco agriculture, which is by its Lebanese economic characteristics, is providing steady income for families but only enough to attain basic sustenance needs and forces the whole family into the labor force at an early age as they can not afford paid labor. Such analysis was confirmed by most municipal officials who were interviewed for this study and by all focus group participants in both the session of education and session on the economy of South Lebanon (Date).

This in a result means that enhancing education conditions for the population in South Lebanon entitles a comprehensive intervention on the social and economic level to tackle the roots of the problem.

In addition to these local conditions there is also the instability of political and security situation in South Lebanon which have emptied the area of its residents over the year and much contributed to hinder the region from developing.

B. Impact of the July War

The 2006 war inflicted a multifaceted damage on educational services and performance. First, the hostilities destroyed and damaged a large number of schools in southern Lebanon (counting to 55 damaged schools according to the local authorities on a map prepared by HIC Lebanon on August 2006). The other forms of damage were psychological, social and economic in nature. Psychological damage was obvious the drop of the academic performance of students whereby 40% of southern students passed in the year that followed the war (Focus Group on Education conducted by Lebanon Support on). As for the economic aspects of damage, dropout rates (although considered not to be severe) are a function of the economic pressure that prevents parents from paying the tuition fees of their children, or the rise in the rates of child labor.

C. Recovery activities and Progress

The education sector in its operations and infrastructure had a fast recovery, where the school year was started with only one month delay, and reconstruction and the rehabilitation of schools was accomplished fast. And by mid 2007 all schools were rehabilitated and reconstructed. The response from donors on the recovery and reconstruction of the physical educational sector in South Lebanon was the fastest compared to other sectors.

State/Organization	No. of adopted schools	Region
United Arab Emirates	216	South, Nabatiyeh
Qatar	30	South, Nabatiyeh
Development Switzerland	54	Bekaa, North, Mount Lebanon
Walid Ben Talal	10	Southern Dahieh
MERCYCORP	40	South, Nabatiyeh, Baalbeck
International Orthodox Charitable Organization	22	South, Nabatiyeh
Farah Al-Ataa	3	Marjehyoun
Caritas	2	Saida
Germany (KFW)	21 vocational schools	Bekaa, South
Turkey	35 units of ready schools	
Iran	71	Southern Dahieh, Bekaa

Source: www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb

And by April 2007 the progress was assessed by HRC (higher relief council) to be 90%.

Extract from the April 2007 Update on reconstruction activities prepared by www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb

<p>The Ministry of Education is still monitoring the rehabilitation and reconstruction process of damaged schools, and so far 791 out of a total of 862 schools have been rehabilitated, 22 totally destroyed schools are still being reconstructed, and 22 prefabricated schools out of a total of 50 schools offered by Turkey have been installed. Details of rehabilitation were as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HRC finalized the rehabilitation of 353 public and private schools in all regions that welcomed refugees during the offensive totaling LBP 6 billion, and is contracting some additional necessary works for 29 schools, based on the Ministry's request • The UAE finalized rehabilitation work on 257 schools in the South and 11 schools in the Shouf area, and is currently reconstructing 5 totally destroyed schools in the South • Qatar, which adopted the rehabilitation of 30 schools, finalized the needed restoration in the damaged schools, and will soon start reconstructing the totally destroyed schools • Al Walid Ben Talal Foundation has completed the restoration and reconstruction of 10 schools in Beirut Southern Suburb • Switzerland rehabilitated 63 damaged schools, Mercycorps 40 schools, IOCC 22 schools, Caritas 2 schools, Farah al Ataa 3 scgools, while Iran is still studying the rehabilitation of 71 schools • In addition, the USA offered a USD 6 million grant for rehabilitating and re-equipping 219 schools.

It is important to see that recovery in terms of education was not only restricted to reconstruction and rehabilitation activities but also included several psychosocial activities either organized by International and Local NGOs and also organized by local CBOs and through community initiatives.

In addition to psychosocial activities, school kits were distributed by UNICEF and other INGOs which purpose were to enhance accessibility

and to encourage students in their education, yet these activities were not sufficiently recorded to study their impact or real contribution to the enhancement of the education sector after the war.

D. Gaps

The major gaps pertaining to the recovery of the educational sector in the south are the following:

- Overlap and poor coordination between entities undertaking relief interventions.
- Some villages or towns received in-cash and in-kind donations from several entities while other towns did not receive any form of donation.
- Relief and recovery interventions are not properly monitored and oriented.
- Psychosocial interventions are ineffective in lessening the psychosocial effects of the war and limited in their scope of coverage. For example, awareness campaigns concerning UXOs contained a psychosocial component; however it is not being applied along this initial design.

Completed and ongoing interventions with respect to the educational sector have partially solved the problems pertaining to the physical infrastructure of educational services. However, the traditional methods of teaching/learning methods maintain due to the lack of a comprehensive strategy or plan for applying participative learning methods.

VIII- Health Sector

A. Introduction & Pre-War Context

Overall, there are 12 hospitals in the south: 5 hospitals in Nabatieh, 6 in Tyre, and 1 in Bint Jbeil. The main problem of medical service provision is the concentration of hospitals in the cazas of Tyre and Nabatiyeh whereas the Caza of Bint Jbeil is endowed with one hospital (40 beds capacity) that lacks proper equipment and can be used for simple surgeries. It is difficult for patients from Bint Jbeil to access hospitals in the other two cazas because of their geographical remoteness and bad road networks. All hospitals in general lack modern equipment and have little capacities of receiving patients; several patients are readmitted or transferred to hospitals in Saida and Beirut As for smaller medical centres, people seek them to get medicines. Specialized clinics are rare, and in most cases, patients who seek them continue their diagnosis and treatment in hospitals. A few number of ambulances operate in the South and they are not properly equipped transporting certain cases. The medical staffs working in hospitals of the South is qualified.

B. Impact of the July War

Israeli military actions directly targeted hospitals, medical centers, clinics and ambulances. The intensity of the military operation hindered injuries from reaching hospitals; the factor that worsened the conditions of most injured people who could not receive prompt medical treatment.

After the end of the military operation, several cases of skin infections and diseases were reported.

C. Interventions

Most recovery interventions in the health sector happened in the form of individual initiatives that focused on the rehabilitation and re-equipment of damaged healthcare facilities. The limited scope of these interventions could not address the accumulated problems of the sector. In other words, recovery interventions in the health sector lacked systematic or comprehensive interventions. Only the physical damage of clinic facilities was indemnified, yet equipments were not considered in the compensation amounts. (Lebanon Support Focus Groups on)

And a report compiled by www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb indicates that:

“The Ministry of Public Health managed to date to rehabilitate and commission Mays Al-Jabal Hospital and Marjehyoun Hospital that stopped working due to the war actions. The Ministry is also coordinating with the bodies entrusted by the United Arab Emirates to restore and re-equip the governmental hospitals in Marjeyoun, Bent Jbeil and Ourqoub villages.”

D. Gaps and Recommendations

- i. Hospitals should be supported and well-equipped at least for treating more patients
- ii. There is need for equipped ambulances.
- iii. Recovery and intervention efforts should be coordinated to avoid overlap between the different initiatives
- iv. Cazas of the south should be endowed with more hospitals in order respond properly to future situations
- v. There is a need for improving/upgrading the public hospital.